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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
THE ROLE OF SNAP AND HABIT FORMATION  
ON HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION BEHAVIOR 
 
 This collection of essays examines the impact of two antecedents of household 
food consumption: SNAP and habit formation to nutrients. Household food choice 
invariably plays a substantial role in health outcomes such as obesity. Low-income 
households may be especially vulnerable to obesity as they face a more restricted set of 
food choices due to income constraints and may have less information on healthy eating 
relative to high-income households. This dissertation unravels this dynamic by providing 
causal estimates of the effect of two major determinants of food choice.  
 
 Chapter 2 and chapter 3 test the impact of SNAP participation on consumption of 
foods that are likely to cause obesity. With some exceptions, SNAP restricts benefits to 
be spent only on unprepared grocery food items from participating retailers. Chapter 2 
considers the broad category of Food Away From Home (FAFH) which is shown to be 
less healthy than meals prepared at home and shows that SNAP significantly reduces 
FAFH expenditure of participants. However, the magnitude of this decrease is not large 
enough to have a tangible impact on obesity. Chapter 3 considers household expenditure 
on carbonated soda, which is the key source of sugar intake among low-income 
households. Not only is carbonated soda SNAP-eligible, it is cheaper when purchased 
with SNAP benefits relative to cash because benefits are exempt from all sales taxes. 
Results show that SNAP participation leads to a significant rise in carbonated soda sales 
in low-income counties. I also find that the SNAP tax exemption does not lead to higher 
consumption among participants relative to non-participants.  
 
Chapter 4 tests habit formation to dietary fat using purchases of ground meat and 
milk products. Products in both categories have salient fat content information on the 
packaging. Products within each category differ only by fat content and are usually 
 
 
identical otherwise. Differences in habit formation are, therefore, caused by different 
levels of fat content. Results show a positive association between habit formation and fat 
content for all products in the ground meat category and all products, except fat-free 
milk, in the milk category. However, this relationship is modest leading to the conclusion 
that policy interventions, such as a saturated fat tax, might be effective in discouraging 
consumption of high fat products. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) (formerly known as the Food 
Stamp Program) is the largest nutrition assistance program in the US. It provides in-kind 
benefits to food insecure households based on a broadly defined eligibility criteria. 
Relative to other nutrition assistance programs that target narrow demographics such as 
The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), 
which provides benefits for pregnant and nursing mothers and nutritionally at-risk infants 
and children, SNAP caters to generally all low-income households. As a result, it is an 
important safety net for impoverished families. 
Over the last few decades, SNAP has gone through a series of drastic changes. 
While initially meant to alleviate food insecurity, the program’s goals have expanded 
towards encouraging beneficiaries to consume healthy diets. This two-pronged approach 
has developed at the heels of a rapid surge in obesity rates among low-income households 
in the US. Moreover, SNAP has seen a consistent increase in program caseloads across 
the country since the early 2000s. In large part, this can be explained by state-level 
adoption of policies that substantially eased the eligibility criteria and reduced 
administrative burden. Some examples of these policies include the reduction of the asset 
limit or complete elimination of the asset test, introduction of the Electronic Benefit 
Transfer (EBT) system, extension of eligibility to non-citizen immigrants, and use of 
online application systems. The concomitant spread of obesity and expansion of SNAP 
have led some researchers to question the link between the two events. 
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Initiatives to promote healthy diets include an outright restriction on what 
beneficiaries can spend SNAP dollars on. The program restricts purchases to include only 
grocery food that requires at-home preparation for consumption. However, there are two 
major caveats that compromise the efficacy of this initiative. First, most SNAP 
participants have household food expenditure greater than the amount of benefits they 
receive. These households, called “inframarginal” households, are easily able to 
substitute current cash expenditure on food with SNAP benefits and utilize the now-
available cash to purchase products ineligible with SNAP benefits. The fungibility of 
benefits with cash essentially renders the SNAP food restriction non-binding. Second, a 
controversial exception to the SNAP food restriction is Sugar-Sweetened Beverages 
(SSBs). It is well-established that SSBs, such as carbonated soda and sugar-sweetened 
fruit juices, are one of the primary contributors to America’s obesity epidemic. Not only 
are SSB products SNAP-eligible they are also exempt from all state and local sales taxes 
when purchased with benefits. As a result, the extent to which SNAP achieves the 
objective of encouraging low-income households to make healthy eating choices is a 
question which has largely been unanswered. 
An important factor that confounds our understanding of SNAP and its impacts on 
consumption behavior is selection bias that arises from participation. That is, households 
that choose to participate in the program may have unobservable differences from those 
that are eligible but do not participate. Selection bias, if unaddressed, poses a serious 
challenge to obtaining unbiased estimates and has led to lack of consensus on the effects 
of SNAP on nutritional outcomes. Researchers have employed a series of methods to 
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overcome this issue, ranging from the use of instrumental variables to employing a 
natural experiment for identification.  
This collection of essays explores the multifaceted nature of the obesity epidemic 
in the US. It spans the dynamic between household consumption behavior and 
government welfare policies that are in place to combat obesity. While much research has 
been devoted to analyzing the impact of these two antecedents, given the complex nature 
of their mutual interdependence there is a growing need to study them concurrently. This 
dissertation addresses this issue and provides insight into how public policy can be used 
to drive behavior modification. One of the main contributions of this dissertation is the 
use of innovative research design to provide causal estimates of the effect of SNAP on 
consumption behavior. I utilize state-level variation in SNAP participation arising from 
two major economic downturns in the US in the past two decades to circumvent the issue 
of selection bias. The first two essays (Chapter 2 and 3) provide estimates obtained from 
the application from this methodology. To the best of my knowledge, the use of 
recessions as natural experiments in this context is unprecedented. 
The main focus of the first essay (Chapter 2) is to determine the impact of SNAP 
on obesity through the medium of Food Away From Home (FAFH) consumption. The 
paradoxical positive association between food insecurity and obesity has led researchers 
to identify FAFH expenditure as one of the possible causes of overweight among low-
income individuals. While FAFH does not qualify for purchase with SNAP dollars, 
inframarginal households are able to circumvent this restriction. This study exploits 
variation arising from the early 2000s recession to identify the impact of SNAP on 
FAFH. Results show that SNAP has been largely successful in achieving its goal of 
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encouraging households to decrease FAFH expenditure. However, an informal 
calculation shows that the FAFH decrease has a trivial effect on obesity. 
The second essay (Chapter 3) explores the impact of SNAP participation on 
consumption of carbonated soda. It is not surprising that the inclusion of carbonated soda 
in the basket of SNAP-eligible products is widely debated given that carbonated soda is 
one of the largest sources of sugar consumption in the country. This essay utilizes state-
level variation in SNAP participation arising from the Great Recession of 2008 to 
identify the effect of SNAP on carbonated soda sales. Results show that SNAP does lead 
to a non-trivial increase in weekly county-level soda sales but the tax exemption has little 
to no influence on this relationship. As a result, policymakers need to carefully consider 
whether imposing sales taxes on soda will produce a tangible decrease in soda 
consumption. In addition, these taxes might be regressive as there is some evidence that 
low-income households have a higher per-capita SSB consumption relative to high-
income households. 
The third essay considers the possibility that habit formation might be an 
impediment to behavior modification, thus subduing public efforts to encourage low-
income households to make healthy nutrition choices. This study delves into the 
attributes of food to examine whether habit formation occurs at the nutrient level. I 
estimate habit formation to dietary fat using purchases of two categories of products that 
display salient fat content information on the packaging. I find that while these products 
exhibit strong habit formation, there is only weak evidence for a positive relationship 
between habit formation and fat content. These results have broad implications for 
whether a tax on saturated fat is a viable policy option. A saturated fat tax may not lead to 
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substitution to lower-fat products, however, given the limited responsiveness of demand 
to price changes it might be an effective tool for raising revenue.  
The three essays in this dissertation provide insight into one of the most 
penetrating issues of today. By many measures, obesity has reached epidemic 
proportions. SNAP has been a major driving force behind preventing households from 
falling into poverty and consequent food insecurity. Even though most beneficiaries are 
considered inframarginal, participation does lead to greater expenditure on FAH relative 
to FAFH. However, SNAP-eligible goods include SSBs which, consequently, leads 
households to increase consumption of carbonated soda. Welfare programs need to be 
designed such that they target the correct demographic and in an effective way. Poorly 
designed programs, though well-intentioned, may exacerbate the prevalence of obesity. 
Policy interventions such as Pigouvian taxes need to be considered concurrently with 
welfare programs. As a result, public policy must be comprised of a menu of options that 
target different aspects of household consumption behavior. 
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CHAPTER 2: HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION RESPONSES TO SNAP 
PARTICIPATION 
Obesity is inordinately prevalent among food insecure households in the US. Some 
researchers have identified the consumption of unhealthy food a major source of this 
seemingly paradoxical relationship. One of the goals of the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly known as the Food Stamp Program, is to 
encourage healthy eating behavior among low-income households. However, literature 
lacks conclusive evidence for the success of the program in achieving that goal. This 
paper exploits an underutilized source of variation, the early-2000s recession in the US, 
to determine the impact of SNAP participation on household Food Away From Home 
(FAFH) expenditures. A Difference in Difference model is constructed using high post-
recession growth in SNAP caseloads as treatment. The results show that households in 
the treatment cohort significantly decrease consumption of FAFH relative to households 
in the control group. This provides evidence that SNAP participation leads households to 
make healthier eating choices. However, reductions in FAFH are too small to have a 
tangible impact on obesity. 
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I. Introduction 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is a federal nutrition-assistance 
program that is regulated by the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) of the USDA and 
provides welfare benefits to numerous households throughout the United States. While 
the program has been touted for successfully targeting food insecurity in the US, it has 
also been criticized for having the unintended consequence of promoting obesity in low 
income households. The food insecurity-obesity paradox (Dietz, 1995), which states that 
there is a positive association between the contradictory states of food insecurity and 
obesity, has long puzzled researchers. Intuitively, households that are unable to fulfill the 
nutrition needs of their members should exhibit starvation. However, in practice food 
insecurity has been shown to be positively correlated with overweight and obesity, 
especially among women (Basiotis and Lino, 2003; Townsend et al., 2001; Olson, 1999; 
Adams et al., 2003; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2003; Dinour et al., 
2007). In particular, individuals in food insecure households who also participate in 
SNAP have a greater likelihood of obesity (Meyerhoefer and Pylypchuk, 2008; 
Townsend et al., 2001; Robinson and Zheng, 2011; Baum, 2011; Gibson, 2003; Chen et 
al., 2005). 
Economists have offered two major explanations for the role of SNAP in 
promoting obesity among food insecure households. First, obesity among SNAP 
beneficiaries might be attributed to the Food Acquisition Cycle (Wilde and Ranney, 
2000). The monthly income shock from benefit receipt might cause severely food 
insecure to engage in binge-eating behavior and exhaust funds earmarked for food 
consumption well before the receipt of next month’s benefits. This spell is followed by a 
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period of hunger during which households cut back on food consumption to make funds 
last until the end of the cycle. This feast and famine cycle is hypothesized by researchers 
to cause obesity.  
The second factor offered as explanation of SNAP’s role in obesity is that 
participation may lead households to increase expenditure on Food Away From Home 
(FAFH) (Fox et al., 2004). However, there is some debate among researchers whether 
FAFH leads to obesity. Literature has shown that FAFH tends to be more energy dense 
(Binkley, 2008) and less healthy than Food At Home (FAH) (Mancino et al., 2009). In 
particular, Currie et al. (2010) show that proximity to a fast food restaurant increases the 
likelihood of obesity among children and pregnant women significantly. On the other 
hand, Anderson and Matsa (2011) determine that there is no causal link between food 
consumption at restaurants and obesity. Cai et al. (2008) conclude that neither FAH nor 
FAFH expenditures have a significant influence on overweight rates. Other researchers 
have focused on the direct relationship between FAFH consumption and diet quality. 
Bowman et al. (2004), Paeratakul et al. (2003), Binkley (2008), and Todd et al. (2010) all 
find that fast food consumption leads to poor diet quality while the last two studies also 
find greater caloric intake as a consequence of fast food consumption.  
While SNAP benefits are restricted to be spent on FAH only, households that 
spend more on food than the amount of SNAP benefits they receive can substitute current 
cash expenditure on food for SNAP dollars. These households are termed ‘inframarginal’ 
and the fungibility of SNAP benefits with cash allows them to utilize benefits for 
purchases of SNAP-ineligible items such as FAFH. While this effect has been repeatedly 
theorized by researchers, there is sparse empirical evidence to determine the true effect of 
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SNAP on FAFH expenditure. Among a handful of studies, Hoynes and Schanzenbach 
(2009) employ program introduction as source of variation and find a negative but 
insignificant association between SNAP and FAFH expenditure. Beatty and Tuttle (2015) 
use increases in SNAP benefits due to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) as a natural experiment and also find a negative but statistically insignificant 
relationship between SNAP benefits and FAFH expenditure. 
The focus of this study is the second alleged source of obesity outlined above. In 
particular, I provide a test of whether SNAP participation leads to changes in FAFH 
expenditure and FAFH as a share of total food expenditure. The early-2000s recession 
was followed by sudden spikes in SNAP caseloads across the country. However, there is 
tremendous state-level variation in the impact of the recession and in the willingness of 
states to expand eligibility, leading to significant differences in the rate and magnitude of 
the increase in SNAP participation. I exploit this variation to compare changes in 
household FAFH expenditures in states that experienced large spikes in SNAP 
participation to states in which the participation increases were milder. The Difference in 
Difference (DID) model utilized in this study defines treatment as high growth in SNAP 
caseloads. Consequently, the treatment group is comprised of 15 states with highest rate 
of growth in post-recession SNAP participation and the control group as comprised of 15 
states with the lowest rate of growth in post-recession SNAP participation. Results show 
participation leads to a modest but statistically significant decrease in FAFH expenditure 
in the high growth cohort relative to the low growth cohort. In addition, participation has 
a significant negative effect on FAFH as a share of total food expenditure which indicates 
that participants substitute FAFH for FAH. As expected, the effect is stronger for 
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households that have greater exposure to treatment, that is, a higher likelihood of 
participating in SNAP as a result of the recession. However, the magnitude of the 
decrease in FAFH is not large enough to have a meaningful impact on calorie intake and 
BMI. 
This paper is organized in the following way. Section II provides a background of 
SNAP and the early 2000s recession in the contextual framework of DID estimation. 
Section III gives an overview of data above along with a discussion of summary 
statistics. Section IV presents descriptive evidence for the effect of SNAP participation 
on FAFH. Section V explains the research design and methodology employed in the 
construction of the empirical model. Section VI presents results of the DID estimation. 
Section VII includes a discussion of policy implications and section VIII concludes. 
II. Background 
In the past decade or so, SNAP participation has gone through a series of drastic changes. 
For the better part of the 1990s SNAP caseloads steadily declined nationwide, especially 
following the welfare reform of 1996 called the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). Changes made by PRWORA included the 
elimination of immigrant eligibility and replacement of the traditional Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) program with a state block grant called Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) which consequently redefined categorical 
eligibility (Laird and Trippe, 2014). Part of the decrease in SNAP caseloads can be 
explained by the consistent rise in income of households at the bottom 20% of the income 
distribution, rising from a mean of $8,595 in 1996 to $10,157 in the year 2000 (US 
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Census Bureau, 2015). Following this period of contraction, SNAP caseloads sharply 
rebounded as the economy entered the early 2000s recession. Figure 2-1 shows the trend 
in national average SNAP participation rates from 1989 to 2012. Of particular note is the 
trend reversal in the year 2000 at which point participation rates started to rise across the 
country. 
This sudden spike in SNAP caseloads in response to the recession can be 
explained by two major factors: decline in income of poor households (from $10,157 
mean income in the year 2000 to $9,996 in 2003 (US Census Bureau, 2015)) and 
relaxation of SNAP eligibility requirements at the state level (such as the elimination of 
the asset test, introduction of Broad Based Categorical Eligibility (BBCE), and simplified 
reporting). There is substantial state-level variation in the impact of these two effects on 
SNAP participation. Participation growth rates between the year 2000 and 2011 ranged 
from a maximum of about 17% in Nevada to a minimum of 4% in Hawaii. This variation 
is even greater between the years 2000 and 2003, the period immediately following the 
start of the recession, with growth rates ranging from 23.5% in Arizona to -4.4% in 
Hawaii (Economic Research Service, 2013). Shortly after the sudden increase, 
participation growth started to plateau as the economy entered a period of recovery. 
However, the program experienced another large swell at the advent of the Great 
Recession of 2008. This increase has subsided in recent years as the economy 
recuperates. 
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III. Data 
A household-level sample is generated from the 1999 to 2011 cycles of the Current 
Population Survey Food Security Supplement (CPS-FSS). The CPS is a large and 
nationally representative survey of the civilian non-institutionalized population conducted 
monthly and containing extensive labor-market and demographic information. The CPS-
FSS is an annual supplement completed by about two-thirds of all CPS respondents each 
year and is conducted to elicit household-level information on issues regarding food 
security, food expenditure, food consumption patterns, program participation, etc. The 
CPS-FSS provides data on all variables needed to construct the model developed in this 
study including self-reported weekly expenditure on FAFH and FAH and geographic 
identifiers at the state level. The CPS-FSS represents households in all 50 states and 
District of Colombia. 
Table 2-1 shows a snapshot of the sample generated from CPS-FSS. About 16% 
of the households in the sample participate in SNAP during the 15 year period 
considered. Mean food away from home expenditure is just under $45 per week. 
Observations in the period following the start of the recession comprise about 73% of the 
total sample and households in the high growth cohort make up 69% of all households. 
Note that the sample is comprised only of households in the high growth and low growth 
cohorts which jointly represent a total of 30 states. The rest of the variables in Table 2-1 
show demographic characteristics of the representative household in the sample. 54% of 
households have a male household head and the mean head is just under 50 years of age. 
About 10% of the entire sample has household heads that identify their race as black, 
26% are at least college educated, 52% of household heads are married, 63% are 
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employed (either part time or full time), and 2% are enrolled in some education program. 
The average number of members per household is 2.48 while the average number of 
children per household is 0.63. Finally, approximately 30% of all households in the 
sample report family income to be less than $15,000 per year. 
IV. Descriptive Analysis 
The central issue in any SNAP-related research is bias arising from selection into the 
program. To make causal inference, the researcher is tasked with isolating the effect of 
SNAP participation from other, often unobservable, factors that might influence the 
outcome variable. For example, if households that choose to participate in SNAP vary 
significantly in terms of their FAFH expenditure from households that do not participate, 
the estimates of an OLS regression will be biased and cannot be used to make causal 
inference. This may be due to household preferences which are commonly either 
unobserved or difficult to measure. I use a novel research design to overcome this issue 
by exploiting the recession of 2001 in the US as a natural experiment to identify a 
Difference in Difference (DID) model.  
The economic slump at the turn of the century led to a rise in SNAP caseloads in 
all states in the country, essentially reversing the downward trend of the mid to late 
nineties. There is considerable variation, however, in how participation changed between 
states after the occurrence of the recession. Some states experienced a sharp rise in SNAP 
participation rates while others saw a gradual increase or even a decrease.  
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A. Treatment and Control Groups 
Based on state-level participation growth rates, a treatment and a control group is 
constructed. The treatment group, also known as the high growth cohort, includes 15 
states that experienced the highest growth rates in SNAP participation from the years 
2000 to 2011. The control group, also referred to as the low growth cohort, includes 15 
states that saw the lowest growth in SNAP participation during the same time period. 
Table 2-2 shows the list of states included in each of the cohorts. It follows that 
households residing in the high growth states have the highest probability of participating 
in SNAP after the start of the recession and households in the low growth states have the 
lowest probability of participation. Using the early 2000s recession as a natural 
experiment, the estimates of the DID model can be obtained by comparing the change in 
FAFH expenditure of households in treatment states with that of households in control 
states.  
Unbiased estimation of the DID model is contingent on the validity of the parallel 
trends assumption. That is, the change in FAFH expenditure of households in the low 
growth cohort represents the counterfactual outcome of households in the high growth 
states. The validity of the parallel trends assumption is evident if the divergence in FAFH 
expenditures between the treatment and control groups coincides with the divergence in 
SNAP participation growth over the same period. Figure 2-2 shows the average 
percentage change in the level of total SNAP participation indexed to the year 2000 for 
the 15 states in the high growth cohort and for 15 states in the low growth cohort. As is 
clear from the graph, changes in total SNAP participation in each cohort prior to the year 
2000 are largely similar. However, at the start of the recession, total SNAP caseloads 
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increase much more in the high growth cohort relative to the low growth cohort. This 
divergence in SNAP participation lends credence to the notion that the recession was the 
primary catalyst for the resulting heterogeneity in state-level participation growth. 
Similarly, Figure 2-3 shows annual aggregate FAFH expenditure in each cohort 
using data from the CPS-FSS. Until the early 2000s, FAFH expenditure is relatively 
similar in both cohorts. However, after the year 2002 there is an unambiguous divergence 
between the treatment and control group, with FAFH expenditure increasing sharply in 
both cohorts but to a smaller extent in the high growth cohort. Given that the FAFH 
expenditure of the low growth cohort represents the counterfactual outcome for the high 
growth cohort in the DID framework, Figure 2-2 and 2-3 provide evidence that SNAP is 
the main cause behind the muted increase in FAFH expenditure of the high growth 
cohort. I also conduct an empirical test for the validity of the parallel trends assumption 
following the approach of Autor (2003). The results are provided in Table 2-7 and 
elaborated in section VI. Results are well-aligned with graphical evidence and 
corroborate the strength of the DID research design. 
It should be noted that while the divergence in SNAP participation occurred in the 
year 2000, the resulting divergence in FAFH expenditures between the two cohorts did 
not manifest until the year 2002. The delayed response in FAFH consumption to the 
recession might be explained by the theory that households generally exhibit habitual 
consumption of food, the empirical evidence of which is well-established in literature 
(Browning and Collado, 2007; Carrasco et al., 2005; Dynan, 2000; Heien and Durham, 
1991; Khare and Inman, 2006; Naik and Moore, 1996; Richards et al., 2007). As a result, 
intertemporal dependence on food purchases might delay households in altering 
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consumption behavior immediately after participating in SNAP. This effect is discussed 
in greater detail in the sections below. 
B. The Effect of the Recession 
The early-2000s recession led to changes in SNAP participation through two major 
channels: changes in household income and changes in state-level eligibility criteria. The 
heterogeneous effect of the recession on state-level SNAP participation can be explained 
by the differing magnitude of these two effects. First, household incomes declined and 
subsequently poverty rates spiked at a much faster rate in the high growth cohort relative 
to the low growth cohort. Figure 2-4 shows average state-level poverty rates for each 
cohort indexed to the year 2001. The graph shows that after the beginning of the early-
2000s recession the poverty rate in the high growth cohort sharply increased while the 
low growth cohort experienced a milder increase relative to the base year and relative to 
the counterpart cohort. This is consistent with the idea that the post-recession increase in 
SNAP caseloads is partly explained by individuals falling below the poverty threshold 
and qualifying for SNAP under the stricter pre-recession eligibility requirements. 
Second, in response to the recession states in the high growth cohort were quicker 
to implement policies that relaxed the eligibility criteria for participation relative to their 
low growth counterparts. This is apparent for a number of state-level options. Broad 
Based Categorical Eligibility (BBCE) is a policy which eases eligibility by allowing 
participants of other welfare programs such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) to automatically qualify for SNAP 
benefits. Figure 2-5 shows the cumulative number of states in each cohort that had 
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adopted BBCE in each year since 2000. It is obvious from the figure that states in the 
high growth cohort adopted BBCE sooner than states in the low growth cohort. In fact, 
most of the states in the low growth cohort adopted the policy as a result of the Great 
Recession of 2008. On the other hand, several high growth states adopted BBCE in the 
earlier part of the decade well before the 2008 recession. Similarly, Figure 2-6 shows 
changes in the percentage of households in each cohort that are required to seek 
recertification within a 1 to 3 month period as opposed to longer time intervals. 
Recertification imposes a transaction cost and makes it easier for a household to become 
ineligible. As shown in Figure 2-6, the proportion of households with short recertification 
periods declines sharply following the start of the early-2000s recession. However, the 
drop in high growth states is clearly more substantial than their low growth counterparts. 
Not long after the beginning of the descent does the proportion of short recertification 
households in the high growth cohort fall below those in the low growth cohort.  
The two cohorts exhibited similar patterns as it relates to other SNAP policies as 
well. In general, states mostly relied on direct policy changes and administrative options 
to alter eligibility requirements. For example, high growth states more readily adopted 
simplified reporting, which eliminates the requirement that participants must report any 
changes in income and living conditions regularly. Other changes include using telephone 
interviews instead of in-person interviews at recertification without documenting 
household hardship and accepting online SNAP applications. These policies reduce the 
transaction cost of participation for the household. High growth states consistently show 
greater effort to ease eligibility using either streamlined administration or direct policy 
interventions relative to low growth states. Therefore, the variation in SNAP participation 
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growth between the two cohorts can be largely explained by changes in the eligibility 
criteria in the wake of the early-2000s recession. 
V. Research Design and Methodology 
To determine the impact of SNAP participation on FAFH expenditure, I construct a DID 
model exploiting state-level variation arising from the early-2000s recession. The 
strength of the DID approach relies on the key assumption that trends in FAFH 
expenditure would have been similar for both high growth and low growth cohorts in the 
absence of treatment. Even though the two cohorts can differ, observable variation is 
captured by the inclusion of household-level covariates and unobservable differences are 
accounted for using state and time fixed effects.  
 This research design circumvents the most substantial issue that researchers 
encounter when studying the implications of SNAP. Participation in the program is 
generally believed to be endogenous to outcome variables, such as total food expenditure, 
obesity, type of food purchased, etc. Many approaches have been taken to tackle the 
selection issue including the use of various instrumental variables for participation such 
as county participation rate (Burgstahler et al., 2012), state-level SNAP eligibility rules 
(Boonsaeng et al., 2012; Ratcliffe et al., 2011; Gregory and Coleman-Jensen, 2013), and 
percentage of EBT benefits (Yen et al., 2008). However, there is some debate on whether 
instrumental variables completely satisfy the exclusion restriction assumption. Other 
researchers have relied on DID approaches, using natural experiments such as the county-
level introduction of SNAP (Hoynes and Schanzenbach, 2009), the instatement of 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 (Beatty and Tuttle, 2015) 
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which temporarily increased benefit disbursement, and the subsequent elimination of 
ARRA in 2013 (Bruich, 2014). In general, DID models provide cleaner identification 
relative to the use of instrumental variables as long as the exogeneity of the natural 
experiment is established.  
I follow in the footsteps of the latter group of researchers by using an 
underutilized source of variation, the early-2000s recession, to identify the impact of 
SNAP participation on FAFH expenditure. The DID model is given by the following 
equation: 
𝐹𝐴𝐹𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝜏𝐷𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑠 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖 + 𝜃𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑠𝑡 
where 𝐹𝐴𝐹𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡 measures weekly FAFH expenditure in dollars and FAFH as a share of 
total expenditure on food for household 𝑖 residing in state 𝑠 in year 𝑡. The model is 
estimated separately for each outcome variable. The variable of interest is the interaction 
between the intervention dummy 𝐷𝑡, which marks the beginning of the early-2000s 
recession and equals 1 if the household is observed after the start of the year 2001, and 
the treatment group dummy 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑠, which equals 1 if the household resides in a 
state in the high growth cohort. The interaction term 𝐷𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑠 captures the 
effect of the recession on high growth states relative to low growth states and determines 
the impact of SNAP participation on household FAFH expenditure. The coefficient 𝜏 can 
be interpreted as the average dollar change in FAFH expenditures of treatment 
households relative to control households. This coefficient is expected to have a negative 
sign, implying that SNAP participation decreases FAFH expenditure and consequently 
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the FAFH restriction on SNAP benefits is effective. In other words, a dollar of cash is not 
equal to a dollar of SNAP benefits.  
The vector 𝑋𝑖 contains household-level covariates such as income, age of the 
household head, number of children in the household, etc., 𝜃𝑠 and 𝛿𝑡 capture state and 
year level fixed effects respectively, and 𝑖𝑠𝑡  is the error term. The inclusion of state and 
year fixed effects is important as they remove any unobservable variation through which 
the early-2000s recession might influence FAFH expenditure independent of its effect 
through SNAP participation. In the absence of these controls, unaccounted for differences 
between the high growth and low growth cohort might bias estimates of the DID model. 
In addition to estimation of the baseline model using the full sample of 15 states 
in each cohort, a series of sensitivity tests are conducted by restricting the sample to 
households that have a high likelihood of participating in the program in response to the 
recession. First, high growth and low growth cohorts are redefined to include only the 10 
highest growth states and 10 lowest growth states respectively, essentially increasing the 
exposure to treatment for the high growth cohort and reducing exposure to treatment for 
the low growth cohort. Consequently, the average household in the high (low) growth 
cohort of 10 states has a higher (lower) likelihood of participation after the start of the 
early-2000s recession relative to the average household in the high (low) growth cohort 
of 15 states. Second, I estimate a specification of the model that excludes households 
with an annual income lower than $25,000. The federal SNAP eligibility criteria specifies 
a gross income limit of 130% of Federal Poverty Guidelines with exceptions made for 
elderly and disabled households. For a family of four, this threshold translated to about 
$23,000 annual income in the year 2001, about $24,000 in the year 2003, and exactly 
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$26,000 by the year 2006. As a result, households with annual income under $25,000 are 
those which satisfied the eligibility criteria and were likely already participating before 
the occurrence of the recession. The intervention is unlikely to change the participation 
status of households in this group and their inclusion in the sample will attenuate the 
impact of participation on FAFH expenditure to zero. On the other hand, the group of 
households with an annual income above $25,000 includes those that are on the margin 
of being eligible for the program and therefore have a higher probability of participating 
in response to the recession. It will also include households who may have been eligible 
before the occurrence of the recession but did not participate. In addition to the sensitivity 
tests, I estimate a DID model to elicit the immediate effect of SNAP participation by 
limiting the sample to only the years 1999 to 2002. This specification captures the effect 
of participation on FAFH within a year of exposure to the treatment and will determine 
the short-term impact of participation on FAFH. 
A. The Effect of Income 
The identification strategy relies on the assumption that apart from the deviating impact 
on SNAP participation, there are no other factors through which the recession 
differentially impacted household FAFH consumption. In other words, there are no 
unaccounted-for variables that confound the impact of SNAP participation on FAFH 
expenditure and therefore FAFH expenditure is unrelated to the recession except through 
changes in SNAP participation. One such confounding variable that may undermine this 
assumption is income. During a recession, declining income may cause households to 
divert their spending from FAFH which is generally considered more expensive than 
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FAH. Todd and Morrison (2014) show that during the Great Recession of 2008 working-
age adults decreased FAFH consumption by 12% and calories obtained from fast food 
and pizza places decreased by about 53%. 
 If the effect of income on FAFH expenditure is not accounted for, the estimates of 
the DID model will be biased upwards. To parse out this confounding effect, I include 
household-level income measures as covariates and rely solely on the second source of 
variation (state policy changes) to identify the model. The CPS-FSS provides a 
categorical measure of income with relatively narrow income brackets, especially for 
low-income households. Binary variables for each income category are included in the 
empirical model to capture time variant income effects for households in the two cohorts. 
In addition, baseline income differences between the high growth and low growth cohorts 
are controlled for by the treatment dummy. As a result, the effect of income is essentially 
removed from the model and the main source of identification is variation arising from 
changes in state-level eligibility criteria. 
VI. Results 
Table 2-3 and Table 2-4 show results from different specifications of the DID model. All 
specifications include state and year fixed effects and standard errors are multi-way 
clustered by state and year. The full set of results for the specifications in Table 2-3 and 
Table 2-4 are provided in Table 2-5 and Table 2-6 respectively. The specifications in 
Table 2-3 posit FAFH as a share of total food expenditure as the dependent variable and 
are estimated for a sample of 240,478 households observed over the years 1999 to 2011. 
Column I presents the results of a parsimonious DID model with the variable of interest, 
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𝐷𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑠, as the only independent variable in addition to state and year fixed 
effects. The coefficient shows that SNAP participation induces households to decrease 
FAFH’s share of total food expenditure by 0.825% and the estimate is significant at the 
10% confidence level. In column II, household level covariates are added to the 
specification in column I. The magnitude of the effect is slightly smaller and has the same 
level of significance. This shows that household demographics introduce noise to the 
effect of SNAP on FAFH. Column III shows results from controlling for annual 
household income in addition to household covariates. As expected, the magnitude of the 
coefficient is smaller than previous specifications. Participation in SNAP leads 
households to reduce FAFH share of total expenditure by about 0.774%. This provides 
evidence that the effect of income imposes an upward bias on the estimates and 
controlling for this confounding effect attenuates the coefficient towards zero. 
 Table 2-4 presents results for additional specifications discussed in the previous 
section. Column I specifies total weekly FAFH expenditure as the outcome variable and 
is estimated for a sample of 271,363 households generated over the period 1996 to 2011. 
This specification allows for a larger sample due to additional data available for the years 
1996 to 1998. The results show that SNAP participation results in an approximate $1.50 
decrease in weekly FAFH expenditure. Columns II through V specify FAFH’s share of 
total food expenditure as the outcome variable. Column I is identical to column III of 
Table 2-3 and is juxtaposed with other specifications in this table for comparison. 
Column III presents results from the sample that redefines high growth and low growth 
cohorts to include 10 states each. The effect is of a substantially higher magnitude and is 
significant at the 1% confidence level. Participation in SNAP causes a 1.2% reduction in 
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FAFH’s share of total food expenditure. This provides evidence of a dose-response effect 
because when the exposure to treatment is amplified, households exhibit a stronger 
response. Column IV shows estimates from the restricted model of households with 
annual income greater than $25,000. The coefficient from this specification shows a 0.8% 
decrease in FAFH as share of total food expenditure and is significant at the 1% 
confidence level. Results from columns III and IV lend support to the validity of the 
model because households with a greater likelihood of treatment exhibit a stronger 
impact of SNAP participation on FAFH. To further explore the influence of income 
heterogeneity on this relationship, Table 2-8 juxtaposes estimates from the restricted 
sample of households with income below $25,000 with a sample of households with 
income above $25,000. As expected, the effect of SNAP participation on households with 
income below $25,000 is smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant. Finally, 
column IV presents results from the model which restricts the sample to the years 1999 to 
2002. The immediate effect of participation is approximately 0.83% decrease in the 
outcome variable and the coefficient is significant at the 5% confidence level. 
I provide an empirical test for the strength of the parallel trends assumption by 
including leads and lags in the DID model as shown in Table 2-7. An in-depth 
explanation of this technique can be found in Autor (2003). The model includes 
interactions of year dummies with the treatment variable 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑠 and is specified 
for both FAFH expenditure and FAFH share as the outcome variable. This allows us to 
compare the effect of treatment on FAFH for each year relative to the baseline period. 
For the parallel trends assumption to be satisfied, the coefficients on pre-recession 
interactions must be insignificant, denoting similar trends in each cohort. Column I shows 
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results of the specification that poses FAFH expenditure as the outcome variable. Since 
the year 1996 was unlike the following years in the decade due to the passage of 
PRWORA, I consider both 1996 and 1997 as baseline years. Note that the year 1998 is 
not included in the analysis due to the absence of FAFH expenditure variable in that 
year’s CPS-FSS cycle. Column I provides strong evidence for the validity of the parallel 
trends assumption. Pre-recession interactions are highly insignificant and have positive 
coefficients indicating that FAFH trends were relatively similar in the two cohorts. Post-
recession interactions are also informative. The coefficient on the 2001 lead variable 
exhibits a clear divergence from the pre-recession trend, with FAFH expenditure in 
treatment states experiencing a sharper plummet relative to control states. This 
divergence not only persists over time but invariably grows as indicated by interactions 
for later years. Column II shows estimates for the regression on FAFH share. Although 
the interpretation of these results is not as unambiguous as column I, they provide some 
insight into the validity of the parallel trends assumption. Recall that the CPS-FSS does 
not include measures for FAFH share prior to the year 1999, therefore, the baseline for 
this regression is 1999. The year 2000 exhibits a large jump in the effect of treatment on 
FAFH share relative to the previous year and is followed by a sharp drop following the 
start of the recession. This divergence also strengthens over time leading to significantly 
lower FAFH expenditures following the SNAP expansion. While pre-recession FAFH 
share trends are not parallel, there is a clear post-recession trend reversal due to which 
SNAP led to a larger decline in FAFH share in the treatment group relative to the control 
group. Therefore, columns I and II provide ample evidence that the DID research design 
is sound.  
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VII. Discussion 
According to economic theory, for inframarginal households in-kind benefits are similar 
to an equivalent cash transfer. Consequently, inframarginal households cannot be 
restricted to spend SNAP benefits on FAH only because benefits are fungible with cash. 
In this case, participation would not lead to a decrease, and might even result in an 
increase, in FAFH expenditure as the income shock might cause households to spend 
more on meals out. This is evident in the results obtained by Hoynes and Schanzenbach 
(2009) who show that the marginal propensity to consume food out of SNAP benefits is 
close to the marginal propensity to consume food out of cash income. 
The results of the model developed in this study show that SNAP participation not 
only leads to a decrease in FAFH expenditure but also in FAFH as a share of total food 
expenditure. In other words, SNAP participation causes households to reallocate food 
expenditure away from FAFH and towards FAH. As a consequence, even though 
households are generally considered inframarginal (and therefore SNAP benefits are 
fungible with cash) the restriction on using SNAP benefits for FAFH expenditure out of 
SNAP benefits is effective in altering behavior for most participants. A possible 
explanation for the deviation from the predictions of canonical economic theory is that 
households might fail to assess the fungibility of SNAP benefits with cash. In this case, 
the “power of suggestion” of the program design might induce tangible changes in 
household consumption behavior. Another explanation might be that the fungibility of 
benefits has been overstated in literature. Households might not be as inframarginal as 
previously shown and therefore participation may significantly distort utility-maximizing 
consumption. A third possible explanation is that even though inframarginal households 
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do not increase their total expenditure on food, SNAP might cause them to change the 
mix of FAH and FAFH in their total food consumption.  
 While SNAP participation causes a statistically significant decrease in household 
FAFH expenditures, the effect on obesity is trivial. A $1.50 decrease in weekly FAFH 
can be expressed as a calorie change using a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation. 
Mancino et al. (2009) report that each meal away from home adds about 130 calories to 
daily intake relative to FAH. Assuming a range of $5 to $15 for the cost of a FAFH meal 
purchased by a low income household (depending on the type and source of food 
obtained), we can infer that additional daily calories per dollar range from about 26 to 9. 
Reduction in FAFH expenditure resulting from SNAP participation is approximately 
$0.214 daily ($1.5 weekly) which translates to a decrease ranging from 6 to 2 calories per 
day. In addition, Mancino et al. (2009) determine that if all weekly FAFH meals are 
replaced by FAH meals, it would lead to an annual weight reduction of 8 lbs per 
individual or annual BMI reduction ranging from 1.16 to 1.36. Given the average weekly 
FAFH expenditure of $46 in my sample, it can be inferred that a $1.50 decrease in 
weekly FAFH expenditure would be associated with an annual weight reduction of 0.3 
lbs for each participant. This equals a BMI reduction in the range of 0.04 and 0.05 per 
year. Overall, while SNAP has been largely successful in inducing households to cut 
FAFH expenditure, the effect is too small to have a tangible impact on obesity. 
 This result has immense policy implications. The SNAP restriction on FAFH was 
designed to couple efforts to alleviate food insecurity with the fight against obesity. 
However, as is clear from the results the program falls short of producing an 
economically significant change in obesity. As a result, the gain from obesity reduction is 
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likely not enough to offset the welfare loss from the SNAP restriction on FAFH and this 
policy might not be as effective as previously thought. While there may be other reasons 
to advocate for cutting FAFH expenditure, the magnitude of the relationship between 
FAFH and obesity is insufficient to warrant the use of SNAP as a viable intervention to 
tackle obesity. 
VIII. Conclusion 
This study provides a direct test for the relationship between SNAP participation and 
household FAFH expenditure. I exploit an underutilized source of variation in state-level 
SNAP caseloads, the early-2000s recession, as a natural experiment to identify a simple 
Difference in Difference model. Treatment is defined as the probability of a household 
participating in SNAP and is based on the state’s participation growth in the years 
following the early-2000s recession. The treatment group consists of households that 
reside in any of the 15 states with the highest participation growth rate and the control 
group consists of households that reside in 15 states with the lowest participation growth 
rate. Variation used to identify the Difference in Difference model arises from state-level 
policy changes directed at relaxing the eligibility criteria and easing the administrative 
burden of participation on households. The results show that following the early-2000s 
recession households in the high growth cohort reduced FAFH expenditure by 
approximately $1.50 relative to their low growth counterparts. In addition, households in 
the high growth cohort also exhibited a decline in FAFH as a share of total food 
expenditure, indicating a reallocation of food expense towards FAH. The effect is 
manifest immediately following the event of the recession but also persists over the long 
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run. These results are robust to a series of sensitivity tests which lend validity to the 
Difference in Difference research design. It follows that SNAP has been successful at 
encouraging households to substitute FAFH for FAH although the magnitude of the 
change is insufficient to substantially reduce obesity. 
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IX. Tables 
Table 2-1. CPS Food Security Supplement Descriptive Statistics by 
Cohort 
Variable Treatment Control 
SNAP (%) 14.3 17 
FAFH ($) 45.7 46.7 
FAFH Share (%) 35 35.6 
Post-recession (2001) (%) 73.9 71.3 
Male (%) 53.8 53.6 
Age 49.5 49.6 
Black (%) 10 11 
College (%) 27.6 26 
Married (%) 52.4 50 
Employed (%) 64.3 62.7 
Student (%) 1.5 1.6 
Number of HH members 2.5 2.5 
Number of children 0.6 0.7 
Family Income < $15K (%) 33 37.3 
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Table 2-2. SNAP Participation Growth Rate by Cohort between 2000 
and 2011 
High Growth Cohort 
 
Low Growth Cohort 
Nevada 16.9% 
 
California 7.6% 
Delaware 14.5% 
 
New York 7.6% 
Idaho 14.0% 
 
Missouri 7.5% 
Arizona 13.6% 
 
Nebraska 7.5% 
Wisconsin 13.4% 
 
Illinois 7.4% 
Utah 13.0% 
 
Mississippi 7.3% 
Massachusetts 12.8% 
 
Montana 6.9% 
Florida 12.7% 
 
Kentucky 6.6% 
Washington 12.4% 
 
Arkansas 6.3% 
North Carolina 11.6% 
 
Washington DC 5.7% 
New Hampshire 11.5% 
 
Louisiana 5.6% 
Maryland 11.4% 
 
North Dakota 5.0% 
Georgia 11.3% 
 
Wyoming 4.8% 
Michigan 10.9% 
 
West Virginia 4.3% 
Colorado 10.8%   Hawaii 4.0% 
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Table 2-3. OLS Regression on Weekly FAFH Share of Total Food 
 
(I) (II) (III) 
D*HighGrowth -0.825* -0.811* -0.744*   
 
(0.5) (0.42) (0.4) 
HH Demographics No Yes Yes 
HH Income No No Yes 
Observations 240,478 240,478 240,478 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  Note 1. All specifications include state and year fixed effects 
Note 2. Standard errors for all specifications are multi-way clustered by state and year 
Note 3. Income measures include binary variables for each category. Demographics are given   
in Table 1. 
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Table 2-4. OLS Regression on Weekly FAFH Expenditure and FAFH 
Share 
 
I   II III IV V 
 
FAFH Expense 
 
FAFH Share 
 
Full Sample 
 
Full Sample 20 States Income>$25K Immediate effect 
D*High Growth -1.473* 
 
-0.774*   -1.182*** -0.807*** -0.825**  
 
(0.87) 
 
(0.4) (0.45) (0.2) (0.36) 
HH Demographics Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HH Income Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 271,363   240,478 126,263 175,078 85,481 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
     Note 1. All specifications include state and year fixed effects 
 Note 2. Standard errors for all specifications are multi-way clustered by state and year 
Note 3. Income measures include binary variables for each category. Demographics are given in Table 1. 
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Table 2-5. OLS Regression on Weekly FAFH Share of Total Food 
(Full) 
 
I II III 
D *High Growth -0.825* -0.811* -0.774* 
Male - 2.691*** 2.569*** 
Age - -0.104*** -0.116*** 
Black - -0.705 -0.042 
College - 1.312*** 0.512*** 
Married - -2.144*** -3.626*** 
Employed - 1.540*** 0.254 
Student - 2.216*** 3.229*** 
No. of HH Members - -2.897*** -3.280*** 
No. of Children in HH - -1.385*** -0.982*** 
$0<Family Income <$5,000 - - -4.386*** 
$5,000<Family Income<$7,499 - - -6.416*** 
$7,500<Family Income<$9,900 - - -5.236*** 
$10,000<Family Income<$12,499 - - -5.668*** 
$12,500<Family Income<$14,999 - - -5.565*** 
$15,000<Family Income<$19,999 - - -4.583*** 
$20,000<Family Income<$24,999 - - -4.323*** 
$25,000<Family Income<$29,999 - - -3.659*** 
$30,000<Family Income<$34,999 - - -3.162*** 
$35,000<Family Income<$39,999 - - -2.833*** 
$40,000<Family Income<$49,999 - - -2.431*** 
$50,000<Family Income<$59,999 - - -1.501*** 
$60,000<Family Income<$74,999 - - -0.974** 
$75,000<Family Income - - 2.260*** 
Constant 36.313*** 47.921*** 53.145*** 
Observations 240478 240478 240478 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  Note 1. All specifications include state and year fixed effects 
Note 2. Standard errors for all specifications are multi-way clustered by state and year 
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Table 2-6. OLS Regression on Weekly FAFH Expenditure and FAFH 
Share (Full) 
 
I   II III IV V 
 
FAFH 
Expense 
 
FAFH Share 
 
Full 
Sample 
 
Full 
Sample 20 States 
Income> 
$25K 
Immediate 
effect 
D*High Growth -1.473* 
 
-0.774*   -1.182*** -0.807*** -0.825**  
Male 5.176*** 
 
2.568*** 2.515*** 2.093*** 2.563*** 
Age -0.164*** 
 
-0.115*** -0.113*** -0.117*** -0.118*** 
Black 0.459 
 
-0.841*** -0.348 -0.072 -0.953**  
College 2.842*** 
 
0.511*** 0.439**  0.488**  1.086*** 
Married -1.814*** 
 
-3.603*** -3.292*** -3.947*** -3.881*** 
Employed 1.003* 
 
0.259 0.069 -0.137 0.291 
Student 2.964** 
 
3.237*** 3.917*** 0.401 3.720*** 
No. of HH Members 2.545*** 
 
-3.292*** -3.301*** -3.330*** -3.419*** 
No. of Children in HH -4.582*** 
 
-0.975*** -0.910*** -0.760*** -0.976*** 
$0<Family Income <$5,000 -16.029*** 
 
-4.418*** -4.645*** 0 -3.871*** 
$5,000<Family Inc<$7,499 -20.094*** 
 
-6.433*** -6.763*** 0 -7.829*** 
$7,500<Family Inc<$9,900 -19.673*** 
 
-5.258*** -4.576*** 0 -6.476*** 
$10,000<Family Inc<$12,499 -17.624*** 
 
-5.683*** -5.378*** 0 -5.437*** 
$12,500<Family Inc<$14,999 -17.273*** 
 
-5.568*** -6.080*** 0 -4.886*** 
$15,000<Family Inc<$19,999 -15.893*** 
 
-4.588*** -4.562*** 0 -4.284*** 
$20,000<Family Inc<$24,999 -13.703*** 
 
-4.324*** -4.081*** 0 -4.330*** 
$25,000<Family Inc<$29,999 -11.870*** 
 
-3.654*** -3.748*** 0 -2.613*** 
$30,000<Family Inc<$34,999 -9.192*** 
 
-3.160*** -2.794*** 0.546*   -2.657*** 
$35,000<Family Inc<$39,999 -7.389*** 
 
-2.826*** -2.419*** 0.899*** -1.819*** 
$40,000<Family Inc<$49,999 -4.470*** 
 
-2.423*** -2.426*** 1.329*** -1.722*** 
$50,000<Family Inc<$59,999 -0.298 
 
-1.489*** -1.257*** 2.314*** -1.230*** 
$60,000<Family Inc<$74,999 3.782*** 
 
-0.962**  -0.755 2.885*** -0.068 
$75,000<Family Inc 25.165*** 
 
2.280*** 2.234*** 6.187*** 3.092*** 
Constant 36.560***   50.440*** 52.630*** 49.888*** 53.300*** 
Observations 271,363   240,478 126,263 175,078 85,481 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  Note 1. All specifications include state and year fixed effects 
Note 2. Standard errors for all specifications are multi-way clustered by state and year 
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Table 2-7.  OLS Regression on Weekly FAFH Expenditure and FAFH 
Share with Leads and Lags 
 
FAFH 
Expenditure  
FAFH Share 
1999*HighGrowth 0.0757 
 
- 
 
(0.485) 
 
- 
2000*HighGrowth 0.559 
 
.848*** 
 
(0.636) 
 
(.311) 
2001*HighGrowth -0.98 
 
-.452 
 
(0.918) 
 
(.286) 
2002*HighGrowth -0.62 
 
-.138 
 
(0.901) 
 
(.255) 
2003*HighGrowth -1.006 
 
-.046 
 
(1.238) 
 
(.393) 
2004*HighGrowth -1.327 
 
-.603 
 
(1.253) 
 
(.432) 
2005*HighGrowth -1.223 
 
.221 
 
(1.567) 
 
(.328) 
2006*HighGrowth -1.512 
 
-.236 
 
(0.946) 
 
(.316) 
2007*HighGrowth -0.882 
 
.294 
 
(1.471) 
 
(.295) 
2008*HighGrowth -2.333** 
 
-.637** 
 
(1.068) 
 
(.315) 
2009*HighGrowth -2.54** 
 
-.902*** 
 
(1.007) 
 
(.348) 
2010*HighGrowth -0.979 
 
-.928*** 
 
(1.152) 
 
(.329) 
2011*HighGrowth -1.573* 
 
-.629** 
 
(0.817) 
 
(.301) 
    HH Demographics Yes 
 
Yes 
HH Income Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 271,363   240,478 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 Note 1. All specifications include state and year fixed effects 
Note 2. Standard errors for all specifications are multi-way clustered by state and year 
Note 3. Income measures include binary variables for each category. Demographics 
are given in Table 1. 
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Table 2-8. OLS Regression on Weekly FAFH Expenditure and FAFH 
Share by Household Income 
 
Income > $25K   Income ≤ $25K 
 
FAFH 
Expenditure 
FAFH 
Share  
FAFH 
Expenditure 
FAFH 
Share 
Post-recession*High Growth -1.540 -0.807*** 
 
-1.058 -0.577 
Male 4.766*** 2.093*** 
 
5.238*** 3.749*** 
Age -0.162*** -0.117*** 
 
-0.148*** -0.108*** 
Black -11.185*** -0.072 
 
-7.195*** 0.313 
College 2.176*** 0.488**  
 
4.245*** 0.378 
Married -3.473*** -3.947*** 
 
-0.099 -3.111*** 
Employed -0.638 -0.137 
 
3.997*** 0.971*** 
Student 2.210* 0.401 
 
2.863* 4.702*** 
No. of HH Members 1.895*** -3.330*** 
 
4.466*** -3.153*** 
No. of Children in HH -3.792*** -0.760*** 
 
-5.890*** -1.496*** 
$0<Family Income <$5,000 - - 
 
0 0 
$5,000<Family Income<$7,499 - - 
 
-12.628*** -3.978*** 
$7,500<Family Income<$9,900 - - 
 
-16.459*** -5.770*** 
$10,000<Family Income<$12,499 - - 
 
-16.550*** -4.730*** 
$12,500<Family Income<$14,999 - - 
 
-15.195*** -5.225*** 
$15,000<Family Income<$19,999 - - 
 
-15.229*** -5.195*** 
$20,000<Family Income<$24,999 - - 
 
-14.245*** -4.270*** 
$25,000<Family Income<$29,999 - - 
 
-12.514*** -4.086*** 
$30,000<Family Income<$34,999 2.771*** 0.546*   
 
- - 
$35,000<Family Income<$39,999 4.729*** 0.899*** 
 
- - 
$40,000<Family Income<$49,999 7.714*** 1.329*** 
 
- - 
$50,000<Family Income<$59,999 12.052*** 2.314*** 
 
- - 
$60,000<Family Income<$74,999 16.341*** 2.885*** 
 
- - 
$75,000<Family Income 37.794*** 6.187*** 
 
- - 
Constant 35.945*** 49.888***   35.639*** 52.354*** 
Observations 195098 175078   76265 65400 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
     Note 1. All specifications include state and year fixed effects 
Note 2. Standard errors for all specifications are multi-way clustered by state and year 
Note 3. Income measures include binary variables for each category. Demographics are given in Table 1. 
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X. Figures 
Figure 2-1: National Average SNAP Caseloads 
 
Source: Economic Research Service (ERS), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Data System 
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Figure 2-2: Changes in SNAP Participation in High Growth and Low 
Growth Cohorts: Index=2000 
 
Source: Economic Research Service (ERS), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Data System 
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Figure 2-3: Annual Aggregate FAFH Expenditure 
 
Source: Current Population Survey Food Security Supplement, 1996 – 2011. 
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Figure 2-4: Average State Poverty Rate by Cohort, Index=2001 
 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic 
Supplements. 
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Figure 2-5: BBCE Adoption of High Growth and Low 
Growth States by Year 
 
Source: Economic Research Service (ERS), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Policy Database 
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CHAPTER 3: THE IMPACT OF SNAP PARTICIPATION ON SALES OF 
CARBONATED SODA 
This study estimates the effect of SNAP participation on carbonated soda sales. Sugar-
Sweetened Beverages (SSBs) are the largest source of added-sugar in the US and are one 
of the main reasons for rampant obesity in the county. To make matters worse, most 
SSBs are eligible for purchase with SNAP benefits which makes low-income household 
particularly vulnerable to obesity. I exploit variation arising from the Great Recession of 
2008 to test whether participation induces households to increase carbonated soda 
consumption. In addition, I explore the role of state and county sales taxes on the 
relationship between SNAP and soda sales. Results show SNAP participation has a non-
trivial positive effect on carbonated soda sales. However, sales taxes on soda do not exert 
any influence on this relationship. 
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I. Introduction 
Sugar-Sweetened Beverages (SSBs) have been attributed as one of the main culprits that 
lead to obesity, especially among low-income households because SSBs are the largest 
source of calories and added-sugar in the US. Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) reports that among adult men and women, and girls aged 2 to 19 years, the largest 
proportion of total daily calories consumed from SSBs is among households with income 
less than or equal to 130% of Federal Poverty Guidelines (FPG). The proportion 
consistently tapers off with higher income groups such that households with income over 
350% of FPG consume the lowest proportion. In addition, non-Hispanic blacks and 
Hispanics consume the highest daily calories of SSBs on average relative to other races 
and Hispanic origin status (Rosinger et al., 2017). Trends in obesity rates are in 
consonance with trends in SSB consumption. Obesity is especially prevalent among low-
income households as more than 33 percent of adults who earn less than $15,000 per year 
are classified as obese relative to about 25% of those who earn at least $50,000 per year 
(Levi et al., 2011). Similarly, non-Hispanic blacks have the highest rates of obesity 
compared to individuals of other races and Hispanic origin (Ogden et al., 2010). 
Exacerbating the effect of obesity is the addictive nature of sugar as shown in 
recent studies. That is, individuals who regularly consume excessive sugar can develop a 
habit such that utility in future periods is a function of sugar consumption in previous 
periods. Zhen et al. (2011) show that households exhibit habit formation to SSBs such as 
carbonated soda, sports and energy drinks, fruit juices, etc. As a result, SSBs may have a 
long term effect on obesity and reducing consumption might be hindered by the habit 
forming properties of sugar. 
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Given the disproportionate prevalence of obesity and SSB consumption among 
disadvantaged socioeconomic groups, it is plausible that SNAP participation might be the 
facilitator of SSB consumption among low income households. Most SSBs (including 
carbonated soda beverages and sugar-sweetened fruit juices) are eligible for purchase 
with SNAP benefits. Moreover, SSBs are less costly when purchased with SNAP benefits 
relative to cash because, in general, SNAP exempts all purchases from state and county 
sales taxes. SNAP benefits may be even less fungible with cash in states that impose a 
grocery tax on food and/or a sugar tax on SSBs. As a result, SNAP participants face a 
lower price of SSBs relative to non-participants to the extent that benefits are utilized. It 
is important to note that the tax exemption does not apply to cash purchases made by 
SNAP participants. Therefore, SNAP only partially offsets the cost of purchasing SSB 
products. 
The results of this study show that SNAP participation leads to an increase in SSB 
consumption. While the benefit transfer is meant to target food insecurity and encourage 
healthy eating, including carbonated soda in the list of eligible products negates that goal. 
If SNAP beneficiaries use their extra benefits for consumption of unhealthy calories, it 
not only defeats the purpose of making low-income households food insecure but it also 
exacerbates the obesity epidemic that is already quite severe. The results of this study 
also show that sales taxes on soda do not influence the relationship between SNAP 
participation and soda sales. In other words, eliminating the tax exemption on soda might 
not have a tangible impact on soda consumption. 
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way: Section II provides a 
short review of literature, section III discusses research design, section IV gives an 
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overview of data, section V presents the empirical model, and section VI explains results 
and policy implications. Finally, section VII concludes and is followed by tables and 
figures in section VIII and section IX respectively. 
II. Literature Review 
Recent literature in economics and public health has looked into household demand for 
macronutrients such as carbohydrates (including sugar) and protein (Bray and Popkin, 
1998; Richards et al., 2007; Bruijn et al., 2008). In addition, researchers have shown 
evidence of changes in Food At Home (FAH) and Food Away From Home (FAFH) 
resulting from participation in SNAP (Hoynes and Schanzenbach, 2009; Beatty and 
Tuttle, 2015).  
However, only a handful of studies examine the link between SNAP and SSB 
consumption. Those that do show only mixed evidence of whether this relationship 
exists. Some studies depict a positive relationship (Andreyeva et al., 2012; Bleich et al., 
2013; Leung et al., 2012; Nguyen et al., 2014; Watt et al., 2013) while others show no 
effect (Todd and Ver Ploeg, 2014; Fernandes, 2012). Of the studies mentioned, only one 
study (Andreyeva et al.) considers grocery store sales of SSBs as a measure of 
consumption. However, Andreyeva et al. include only SNAP participants with a history 
of WIC participation and only one grocery store chain in the New England area in their 
sample. This study adds to literature by considering the impact of SNAP participation on 
retail sales of SSBs using a nationally representative sample generated from a large store-
level scanner dataset, and by employing a novel source of variation to identify the causal 
impact of SNAP participation on retail SSB sales. 
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III. Research Design 
I exploit state-level variation arising from the Great Recession of 2008 to identify the 
effect of SNAP participation on carbonated soda consumption. The occurrence of the 
recession caused changes in SNAP caseloads due to two major reasons. First, household 
income fell sharply due to which households that were previously ineligible for benefits 
qualified for SNAP. Second, there was considerable variation in how states reacted to the 
economic downturn. States that were traditionally more lenient towards participation in 
SNAP readily adopted a series of policies that eased the eligibility criteria. States that 
have historically been more conservative in regards to SNAP participation had a more 
restrained response in terms of SNAP participation. As a result, changes in SNAP 
caseloads happened at drastically different rates in each group. This study relies on the 
second source of state-level variation in SNAP caseloads and explicitly removes the 
confounding effect of the first source. 
A. Factor Analysis 
I hypothesize that an underlying common factor explains state adoption of policies to 
ease eligibility. These policies include a range of options that either directly eliminate 
hurdles to eligibility (for example, broad-based categorical eligibility, removal of vehicle 
restriction in the asset test, and extending participation to include noncitizen immigrants) 
or simplify the administrative process of participation (for example, use of biometric 
technology and accepting online applications). Descriptions of policies used in this 
analysis is given in Table 3-1. I identify a measure of “willingness” using factor analysis 
that determines each state’s readiness to ease eligibility and construct an index to rank 
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states based on their willingness score. States high on the scale are were more open to 
implementing these policies while states low on the scale largely refused to adopt the 
same policies after the start of the Great Recession. Naturally, willing states represent the 
treatment group and unwilling states comprise the control group in this analysis. 
The results of factor analysis are shown in Tables 3-2(a) and 3-2(b). Table 3-2(a) 
depicts the list of identified factors and their corresponding eigenvalues. While several 
factors are identified that explain policy adoption, the Kaiser rule (often cited as the rule 
of thumb) justifies retaining only components with eigenvalues greater than 1. However, 
the Factor 1 explains an overwhelming amount, about 53%, of variation in state-level 
policy adoption while the second factor explains only about 34%. These results indicate 
that while there may be multiple factors that influence state level policy adoption, the 
majority of the variation is explained by Factor 1. Table 3-2(b) depicts factor loadings of 
Factor 1 and Factor 2. The direction of factor loadings of Factor 1 are consistent with 
state’s willingness to ease eligibility. Imposing short recertification periods and 
disqualifying beneficiaries for noncompliance are policies that tighten eligibility while all 
other policies ease the eligibility criteria. The factor loadings of Factor 2, however, show 
no discernible correlation with state’s efforts to expand participation. Therefore, out of 
the two factors retained using the Kaiser rule, I rely only on Factor 1 to explain policy 
adoption. I term this factor “willingness” and disregard the rest of the factors. As a 
robustness check, I construct the willingness index using both factors, Factor 1 and 
Factor 2, and find that only a handful of states receive a treatment or control assignment 
different from the assignment using only one factor. The coefficients of this index are 
simply the averages of predicted coefficients for Factor 1 and Factor 2, indicating equal 
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weights for each factor. This is a conservative measure because Factor 1 explains 
substantially greater variation (53%) than Factor 2 (34%). Accounting for this will 
generate an index that is even closer to the index based on Factor 1 only. 
Note that by assumption the factors obtained from factor analysis are orthogonal 
to each other. That is, the second factor explains residual variation in policy adoption 
after accounting for the first factor and is therefore uncorrelated with willingness. It is 
also important to note that the willingness factor might represent other state 
characteristics that might influence its readiness to adopt these policies. However, this 
does not pose an issue for the research design as long as other characteristics are not 
correlated with carbonated soda consumption except through changes in SNAP 
participation. To the best of my knowledge, literature does not identify any such 
characteristic and therefore we can safely rely on the first factor for ranking. Factor 
analysis is conducted separately for years 2007 and 2008. It is important to compare pre-
recession and post-recession results as willingness might change with the occurrence of 
the recession. In other words, states that experienced a more severe economic downturn 
may become more willing relative to the prerecession period. However, the results do not 
vary drastically between factor analyses conducted for the two years. Most states retain 
their relative ranking on the index. 
Figure 3-1 shows a map of states categorized by their ranking on the willingness 
index. I choose an arbitrary threshold on the index that roughly equally divides the states 
into two cohorts. States above the threshold are classified as treatment states and those 
below are classified as control states. With some clear exceptions (such as Texas and 
Tennessee), Figure 3-1 aligns well with each state’s political majority in the 2008 
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presidential election. Not surprisingly, most states in the Midwest and Southern US that 
were characterized as having a conservative majority in 2008 also rank low on the 
willingness index. Similarly, most states that had a liberal majority in 2008 ranked high 
on the willingness index. For comparison, Figure 3-2 maps states based on the 
willingness index using both Factor 1 and Factor 2. With a small number of exceptions 
(for example, California), the Figure 3-2 is identical to Figure 3-1. Table 3-3 shows 
growth rates of SNAP participation and soda sales for each cohort. The treatment group 
comprises 24 states and the control group comprises 24 states and District of Columbia.  
B. Difference-In-Difference 
I use a Difference In Difference (DID) model to determine the causal effect of SNAP 
participation on carbonated soda consumption. Based on ranking of the willingness 
index, each state is assigned to either the treatment or the control group. Intuitively, the 
treatment group is likely to exhibit a greater increase in SNAP participation following the 
economic downtown in 2008 because it had a more relaxed eligibility criteria relative to 
the control group. Therefore, the difference in the carbonated soda consumption of the 
treatment group and the control group can be attributed to SNAP participation. 
The validity of the DID research design is contingent on whether the parallel 
trends assumption is satisfied. That is, to obtain an unbiased estimator we must ensure 
that pre-treatment trends in SNAP participation and carbonated soda consumption are 
similar across the two cohorts. Figure 3-4 shows trends in aggregate SNAP participation 
in each group, indexed to the year 2008. As is clear from the figure, the two cohorts 
experienced very similar changes in total SNAP caseloads before the occurrence on the 
51 
 
Great Recession of 2008. However, this trend is disturbed in 2008 as the recession causes 
SNAP participation to rise at a faster rate in the treatment group versus the control group. 
The divergence between the two groups widens steadily with time. In addition, I observe 
analogous trends in carbonated soda consumption in the two cohorts. Figure 3-5 shows 
changes in weekly-aggregated carbonated soda consumption for states in the treatment 
and control groups indexed to the year 2008. Carbonated soda consumption moved in 
relative lockstep in the two cohorts prior to 2008 and is followed by a stark deviation 
after the advent of the economic downturn. The divergence in carbonated soda 
consumption corresponds with the divergence in participation in the two groups. This 
indicates that the parallel trends assumption is satisfied and lends credence to the DID 
research design. An empirical test of the parallel trends assumption is conducted as well. 
The results are shown in Table 3-9 and are discussed in the results section. 
The biggest strength of the DID methodology is that it allows us to control for 
selection on unobservables. There might exist unobservable differences between the 
treatment and control groups that confound the effect of SNAP participation on 
carbonated soda consumption. For example, households in the treatment group might 
have a higher preference for carbonated soda than households in the control group. Since 
preferences are unobservable it is nearly impossible to explicitly control for this effect by 
including them in the vector of explanatory variables. However, DID allows us to remove 
baseline differences such as household preference through the inclusion of state-specific 
fixed effects. Similarly, time-variant factors that may influence soda consumption but are 
similar across states can be removed with time-specific fixed effects. 
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A possible source of bias that is not directly accounted for in the DID model is the 
effect of income. It is likely that states experienced the consequences of the Great 
Recession of 2008 at different levels of severity. Some states might experience a sharp 
decline in median income at the immediate forefront of a recession while others may see 
a gradual and less severe economic downturn. As a result, to the extent that income 
influences store-level carbonated soda the estimates obtained from DID will be biased. I 
circumvent this issue by adding median county income as an explanatory variable in the 
empirical specification. This removes the confounding effect of income on carbonated 
soda consumption arising from the economic downturn. The inclusion of income is 
expected to have a positive effect on the estimate of SNAP participation on soda sales 
because it removes downward bias on the coefficient.  
IV. Data 
Store-level data is obtained from Nielsen RetailScan, a large and nationally representative 
scanner-generated dataset that includes weekly information on pricing, volume, and store 
attributes. The dataset is available for years 2006 to 2015 and provides detailed 
information on product and store characteristics (including geography) for a litany of 
SSBs. Moreover, it covers 61 geographic areas (52 major markets and 9 Census 
Divisions) and includes SSB sales from grocery, drug, mass merchandiser, and other 
stores. It represents more than half of the total sales volume of grocery and drug stores 
and 30 percent of mass merchandiser sales volume. The level of detail afforded by the 
data and the years available make it ideal for estimating the model specified below. 
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Among SSBs, this study focuses on the sales of carbonated soda. This category 
represents the majority of SSB sales and is most often associated with high amounts of 
high fructose corn syrup. In addition, carbonated soda is readily available from a variety 
of outlets such as grocery stores, gas stations, convenience stores, and vending machines 
relative to other SSBs products such as sugar-sweetened fruit juices. 
Sales tax data is collected from a variety of sources. Detailed state-level soda 
taxes for each sample year is obtained from Bridging the Gap research program (Bridging 
The Gap). This resource provides accurate tax information for each state including tax 
applied on food and soda and including tax exemptions. The soda tax is equal to the sum 
of the general state sales tax and additional soda specific tax that may be applied at the 
state or county level. It is equal to the state sales tax only if no additional tax is levied on 
soda. While almost all states impose a non-zero sales tax (exceptions include Alaska, 
Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon), several states choose to exempt 
grocery food which may or may not include carbonated soda. 
Counties may choose to impose additional taxes on food, called grocery taxes, 
which may include carbonated soda. In 2014, 16 states imposed grocery taxes at the state 
level, county level, or both. While only a handful of counties add a grocery tax to the 
state sales tax, most county level grocery taxes are imposed in southern states (as shown 
in Figure 3-3) where obesity seems to be especially prevalent. Due to lack of access to 
historical data, I use county-level grocery taxes for the year 2014. However, there is 
generally limited, if any, variation in county taxes over time. In addition, counties may 
choose to exempt carbonated soda from the grocery tax or exclude carbonated soda from 
the grocery tax exemption. This information is not available, therefore, I rely on the 
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assumption that carbonated soda is treated the same as grocery food at the county level. I 
conduct a series of sensitivity checks to determine the strength of this assumption and 
find nearly identical estimates for the DID model. 
Combined grocery tax data are obtained mainly from Tax-Rates.org, augmented 
with data from Sale-tax.com and state and county departments of taxation websites. 
There is considerable cross-sectional variation in combined state and county level taxes 
on grocery food. They ranged from 0% in most of the country to 9% (4% state plus 5% 
county) in Tuscaloosa County, Alabama in 2014. Moreover, the average grocery tax in 
counties that do not exempt groceries is about 4.2%. Figure 3-3 shows a map of 
combined state and county level soda taxes for the year 2014. 
Table 3-4 provides summary statistics by cohort for the sample used in this 
model. From the table, weekly county-level soda sales are considerably higher and 
median income is slightly higher in treatment counties relative to counties in control 
states. In addition, counties in the treatment group are substantially more populous than 
counties in the control group. Counties in the treatment states have an average population 
size that is about twice the population size of counties in the control states. It is not 
surprisingly that larger counties comprise the treatment group because they generally 
have a greater proportion of SNAP beneficiaries. They are also more likely to adopt 
policies to ease the eligibility criteria because they are more likely to have better access 
to administrative resources such as biometric technology and ability to accept online 
applications. Finally, soda taxes are somewhat similar in the two cohorts. Table 3-5 
provides descriptive evidence for the influence of participation on soda sales. The third 
column shows the difference in average weekly county-level soda sales in the treatment 
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and control states before and after the occurrence of the recession. While soda sales 
increased in both cohorts, treatment states experienced an increase of $4,483 while 
control states experienced an increase of $1,151. That is, stores in the treatment states 
experienced a change in soda sales of $3,331 higher than stores in the control states. 
V. Empirical Model 
The research design discussed above gives rise to the following Difference in Difference 
specification: 
𝑆𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡 = 𝜑𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝜃𝑀𝑒𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑡 + 𝜌𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑡 + 𝜏𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑡 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝜕𝑡
+ 𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡 
where the outcome variable represents weekly county-level sales of carbonated soda for 
store 𝑖 located in state 𝑠 and county 𝑐 and observed in year 𝑡. The variable of interest is 
the interaction between the variables 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠 and 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 and the coefficient 𝜑 
determines the effect of treatment on sales of carbonated soda. The variable 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠 
equals 1 if store 𝑖 is located in a state classified as treatment state according to the 
willingness index and equals 0 otherwise. The variable 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 equals 1 if store 𝑖 is 
observed at any time period after January 1, 2008 (the presumed start of the Great 
Recession) and equals zero otherwise. 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑡 is a measure of county-level income and 
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑡 measures county population for each sample year. The two variables, 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑡 
and 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑡, are essential for unbiased estimation of the DID model because they control 
for channels other than SNAP participation through which the Great Recession may 
influence soda sales. Finally, 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑡 represents combined state and county level soda tax, 
𝜇𝑠 and 𝜕𝑡 represent state and year level fixed effects, and 𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑡 is the error term. 
56 
 
VI. Results and Discussion 
The estimates from the DID model are shown in Table 3-6. Columns I and II of the table 
contain results from the model estimated using a full sample of county-week 
observations. Columns III, IV, and V show results from estimation conducted on a 
subsample of counties with median income less than $45,533, the average for counties in 
the full sample. Columns I through IV include results from models that use state and year 
level fixed effects while the results in column V include county and year-level fixed 
effects. 
I start with a parsimonious model (column I) that includes income and population 
as covariates but not soda tax. The coefficient shows no effect of SNAP participation on 
soda sales. Column II includes soda tax as an additional explanatory variable. The 
magnitude and significant of the coefficient does not change much leading to the 
conclusion that soda tax has little to no effect on the relationship between SNAP 
participation and soda sales. The main shortcoming of the first two specifications is that 
they consider soda sales in all counties in the country. Because treatment occurs at the 
state-level, the effects of the recession on each county within a state might be 
heterogeneous. To target counties that had the highest exposure to treatment, I restrict the 
sample to include only low-income counties. A county is defined as low-income if the 
median income in that county falls below the average median income of the full sample 
which is $45,533. While this is a somewhat arbitrary threshold, results are robust to 
different measures of low-income. Columns III, IV, and V show results from the model 
estimated on this restricted sample. As expected, the model in column III has a highly 
significant estimate of treatment on soda sales. SNAP participation leads to an increase of 
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$1,355 in weekly county-level soda sales in treatment counties relative to control 
counties. The inclusion of soda tax attenuates the estimate towards zero and inflates the 
standard error leading to a lower level of statistical significance as shown in column IV. 
Column V adds county-level fixed effects instead of the state-level fixed effects used in 
previous specifications. This drastically inflates the standard errors of the estimate 
making it insignificant at the 10% confidence level. This provides evidence that county-
level unobservable factors influence the effect of SNAP on soda sales. The full results for 
all specifications are given in Table 3-7. 
The effect of income and population is worth noting. Income invariably exerts a 
downward bias on the estimates because treatment is defined as states that adopted 
policies to expand SNAP participation. These states likely experienced greater income 
declines from the recession than the rest of the country. Adding county-level median 
income removes the confounding effect of income and increases the magnitude of 𝜑. 
Population, on the other hand, has the opposite effect. Controlling for county-level 
population changes leads to a sharp decline in the magnitude of the coefficient. This is 
expected because in times of economic hardships, low-income households may migrate 
to states that provide more generous welfare benefits relative to their current state of 
residence. While mobility of low-income households is restricted, several Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the US span multiple states. Within-MSA interstate migration 
is comparably simple and economical. As a result, aggregate county-level carbonated 
soda may increase in treatment states simply due to a greater proportion of migrants. 
Excluding population as a covariate will, therefore, inflate the effect of SNAP 
participation on soda sales. Results show that controlling for population does have a 
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tangible effect on the magnitude of 𝜑 which is an indication of interstate migration 
during recession. 
While the estimated effect of $1,355 may initially seem extraordinarily high, a 
back-of-the-envelope calculation proves that is not the case. I use estimates of annual 
county-level SNAP benefits and annual state-level SNAP participation estimates from the 
SNAP Data System of USDA’s Economic Research Service to compare changes in soda 
consumption to changes in SNAP benefits. The calculation is shown in Table 3-11 in 
section VIII. A 1% increase in weekly county-level SNAP benefits between 2008 and 
2012 was accompanied by a 0.08% increase in consumption of soda over the same 
period. In addition, Table 3-12 presents the differences in SNAP benefits between the 
two cohorts post-recession relative to pre-recession. The difference between average 
weekly county-level SNAP benefits disbursed in the treatment and control group 
increased by about $144,942 in the period after the recession. The Food and Nutrition 
Service (FNS) of the USDA reports that SNAP households spent about 5.4% of their total 
food expenditure on soft-drinks and 9.3% of their food expenditure on SSBs in 2011 
(Garasky et al., 2016). As a result, the increase in benefits is expected to increase soda 
sales in the treatment states relative to control states by about $7,827 (5.4% of $144,942) 
and total SSB consumption by about $13,480 (9.3% of $144,942). Relative to these 
numbers, the $1,355 estimate obtained from the DID model is modest. 
As a test for robustness, I estimate the specifications included in Table 3-6 using 
log per capita sales of carbonated soda instead of total county sales. The results are 
shown in Table 3-8. The preferred specification (column III) shows that SNAP 
participation leads to a 0.5% increase in per capita sales in the treatment counties relative 
59 
 
to the control counties. However, this increase is not statistically significant. Coefficients 
from other specifications are highly insignificant as well. These results imply that while 
the effect of SNAP participation is substantial on total county sales, the effect on per-
capita sales is too small for statistical significance.  
I conduct a formal test of the parallel trends assumption by including leads (pre-
recession interactions) and lags (post-recession interactions) in the DID specification 
discussed above. I closely follow the methodology of Autor (2003) which is described in 
detail in that paper. The results are shown in Table 3-9. The first column poses total 
weekly county-aggregated sales of carbonated soda as the outcome variable and the 
second column estimates the model on per-capita weekly county-aggregated sales. The 
results in column 1 provide strong evidence for the validity of the parallel trends 
assumption. Compared to the base year 2006 interaction, the first lead variable shows an 
insignificant coefficient. In other words, prior to the occurrence of the Great Recession of 
2008, there is no significant difference between the total soda sales of the treatment states 
relative to control states. However, following the start of the recession the difference 
becomes statistically significant, indicating a clear divergence in soda sales. This 
divergence persists over time but eventually dissipates. The validity of parallel trends 
assumption is less convincing for per capita sales. The first lead variable shows a 
statistical difference in the per capita soda sales between the two cohorts relative to the 
base year 2006. This, however, does not completely negate the research design. The 
coefficients on lag variables depict a clear jump in the difference between the two cohorts 
immediately following the occurrence of the recession. This difference widens in the 
following years and weakens short after. While pre-recession trends are not completely 
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parallel in the two cohorts, the diverging trend can partially be attributed to SNAP 
participation. The estimates of the regression on per capita sales, therefore, are likely 
overstated and should be interpreted with that caveat in mind. 
 To remove the confounding effect of seasonal variation in carbonated soda 
consumption, I estimate the DID model with the inclusion of week fixed effects. This 
variation may also arise due to differences in monthly SNAP benefit disbursement cycles, 
weather patterns, sports seasons, and other unobservable factors. If these baseline 
differences effect states differently, not accounting for them will bias the DID estimator. 
Table 3-10 shows results on total and per-capita sales of the DID with the inclusion of 
week fixed effects. The variable of interest is statistically significant in each column and 
the magnitude shows a much larger impact of SNAP participation on soda consumption. 
This leads to the conclusion that seasonal effects introduce a downward bias on the 
estimates and, therefore, need to be accounted for. 
A. Soda Tax 
To further explore the effect of tax on the relationship between SNAP participation and 
soda consumption, I estimate two additional specifications of the model. The results of 
these specifications are shown in columns VI and VII in Table 3-7. In column VI, the 
DID model is estimated on a subsample of states with zero county-level grocery taxes. 
The sample contains stores in areas where there are no local taxes on soda and the 
estimates reflect the impact of state-level soda taxes only. The results show an 
insignificant estimate of $1,695 for the interaction term. Column VII shows results from 
a triple difference model that interacts the tax variable with treatment and recession 
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indicators. The estimate of the triple interaction term shows the effect of the combined 
soda tax on the relationship between treatment (SNAP participation) and soda sales. In 
other words, it depicts that a one percentage point increase in the combined soda tax will 
lead to a decrease of about $92 on the effect of SNAP participation on soda sales in the 
treatment group relative to the control group. The sign of the coefficient is the opposite of 
what we would expect but the estimate is highly insignificant. 
The DID estimates show that soda taxes play little to no role in the relationship 
between SNAP participation and soda sales. Two major factors might explain this result. 
First, literature has shown sales taxes (taxes applied at the cash register) are not as salient 
as other types of taxes such as excise taxes (Chetty et al., 2009; Zheng et al., 2013; Chen 
et al., 2015). As a result, even when consumers receive a sales tax exemption through 
SNAP, their demand for soda does not change by a significant amount. Second, the 
combined sales tax causes only a marginal change in the price of soda. There is 
substantial county-level variation in the tax, however, most counties and states do not 
impose a “disfavored” tax on soda. That is, soda is generally subject to the same amount 
of sales tax as other items (food or non-food) and no soda-specific tax is imposed. 
Consequently, SNAP participation may not generate a large enough price trade-off to 
have a tangible effect on consumption. As a result, the tax exemption only partially 
explains the increase in soda sales for the treatment group and the impact of SNAP 
participation on soda sales can be attributed to positive income shock from benefits. The 
effect of income is particularly strong, especially when low-income counties are 
considered as shown in columns III and IV in Table 3-7.  
62 
 
An important implication of this result is that policy-makers cannot rely on soda 
taxes to discourage consumption by low-income households. Since soda sales are 
relatively unresponsive to sales taxes, eliminating the tax exemption will have only a 
minor effect. Other policy interventions such as removing carbonated soda from the list 
of SNAP-eligible items may be more effective in encouraging households to make 
healthy eating choices. More work is required to determine the extent to which the SNAP 
restriction inhibits purchases of certain food items and how the removal of this restriction 
may influence sales of carbonated soda. However, this study provides initial insights into 
the efficacy of different policies to combat excessive consumption of SSBs by low-
income households. 
VII. Conclusion 
I estimate a Difference In Difference model to determine the impact of SNAP 
participation on consumption of carbonated soda employing store-level data from Nielsen 
RetailScan. I create a willingness index based on state-level adoption of policies to ease 
the SNAP eligibility criteria in the wake of the Great Recession of 2008. Stores are 
assigned to the treatment group if they reside in states that were high on the willingness 
index and to the control group if they reside in states lower on the willingness index. I use 
the occurrence of the Great Recession of 2008 as a natural experiment to identify the 
effect of treatment on sales of carbonated soda. The results show that SNAP participation 
increases weekly county-level soda consumption by about $1,355 in low-income counties 
but exhibits no statistically significant effect in high-income counties. State and local 
soda taxes elicit a very small effect on the relationship between SNAP and soda 
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consumption. Therefore, the majority of the increase can be attributed to positive income 
shock from the SNAP in-kind transfer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: “Calculated (or Derived) based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC and marketing databases 
provided by the Kilts Center for Marketing Data Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business.” 
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VIII. Tables 
Table 3-1. State-Level Policy Option Descriptions 
Policy Description 
BBCE 
The State uses broad-based categorical eligibility to increase or 
eliminate the asset test and/or to increase the gross income limit for 
virtually all SNAP applicants. 
Call Centers 
The State operates call centers, and whether or not call centers 
service the entire State or select regions within the State. 
Combined Application 
Project 
The State operates a Combined Application Project for recipients 
of Supplemental Security Income (SSI), so that SSI recipients are 
able to use a streamlined SNAP application process. 
Short Recertification Period 
The proportion of SNAP units with earnings with 1-3 month 
recertification periods. 
DQ for Noncompliance 
The State disqualifies SNAP applicants or recipients who fail to 
perform actions required by other means-tested programs, 
primarily Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). 
Initial Telephone Interview 
The State has been granted a waiver to use a telephone interview in 
lieu of a face-to-face interview at initial certification, without 
having to document household hardship. 
Fingerprint Requirement The State requires fingerprinting of  SNAP applicants. 
Noncitizen Adult Eligibility 
All legal noncitizen adults (age 18-64) who satisfy other SNAP 
eligibility requirements are eligible for Federal SNAP benefits or 
State-funded food assistance. 
Online Application The State allows households to submit a SNAP application online. 
Outreach Spending 
The sum of Federal, State, and grant outreach spending in nominal 
dollars ($1,000s).  
Simplified Reporting 
For households with earnings, the State uses the simplified 
reporting option that reduces requirements for reporting changes in 
household circumstances. 
Vehicle Exclusion 
The State excludes all vehicles in the household from the SNAP 
asset test. 
Source: Economic Research Service (ERS), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). SNAP 
Policy Database, 2013 
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Table 3-2(a). Factor Analysis on State-Policy Options: Correlations 
 
Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 1.65 0.58 0.53 0.53 
Factor2 1.07 0.46 0.34 0.87 
Factor3 0.61 0.16 0.19 1.06 
Factor4 0.45 0.05 0.14 1.21 
Factor5 0.40 0.13 0.13 1.33 
Factor6 0.27 0.38 0.09 1.42 
Factor7 -0.11 0.04 -0.04 1.38 
Factor8 -0.15 0.06 -0.05 1.34 
Factor9 -0.21 0.04 -0.07 1.27 
Factor10 -0.25 0.03 -0.08 1.19 
Factor11 -0.28 0.03 -0.09 1.10 
Factor12 -0.31 . -0.10 1.00 
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Table 3-2(b). Factor Analysis on State-Policy Options: Factor 
Loadings 
 
Factor1 Factor2 Uniqueness  
BBCE 0.50 0.21 0.71 
Call Centers 0.44 -0.24 0.75 
Combined Application Project 0.36 0.07 0.87 
Short Recertification Period -0.37 0.38 0.72 
DQ for Noncompliance -0.13 0.25 0.92 
Initial Telephone Interview 0.18 -0.20 0.92 
Fingerprinting Requirement 0.35 0.39 0.72 
Noncitizen Adult Eligibility 0.27 0.22 0.88 
Online Application 0.50 -0.15 0.73 
Outreach Spending 0.53 0.39 0.57 
Simplified Reporting 0.25 -0.58 0.60 
Vehicle Exclusion 0.33 0.01 0.89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
67 
 
Table 3-3. SNAP Participation Growth and Carbonated Soda Sales by 
Cohort, 2008 to 2012 
Treatment States 
SNAP 
Participation 
Soda 
Sales 
 
Control States 
SNAP 
Participation 
Soda 
Sales 
Washington 91% 4% 
 
Wyoming 52% 16% 
New York 58% 7% 
 
South Dakota 65% 28% 
Texas 59% 2% 
 
Oklahoma 47% 36% 
Wisconsin 98% 34% 
 
Idaho 133% 5% 
California 79% -9% 
 
New Hampshire 84% 7% 
Pennsylvania 51% 4% 
 
Arkansas 33% 19% 
Massachusetts 70% 7% 
 
New Mexico 83% 16% 
Arizona 79% -10% 
 
North Carolina 76% 3% 
Tennessee 45% 8% 
 
Alabama 59% 6% 
Maryland 99% -3% 
 
Missouri 35% 23% 
Florida 130% -1% 
 
Montana 57% 6% 
Oregon 74% 4% 
 
Colorado 94% 8% 
Delaware 99% -1% 
 
Nevada 146% -6% 
South Carolina 47% 8% 
 
Vermont 73% 5% 
West Virginia 25% 23% 
 
Kentucky 34% 20% 
Virginia 68% 4% 
 
Minnesota 83% -1% 
Indiana 46% 9% 
 
Mississippi 48% 10% 
Georgia 87% 11% 
 
Nebraska 46% 17% 
Connecticut 79% 13% 
 
Louisiana 20% -6% 
Utah 106% 21% 
 
Illinois 44% -8% 
Michigan 46% 11% 
 
New Jersey 89% 1% 
Iowa 58% 9% 
 
Kansas 62% 17% 
Maine 46% 6% 
 
District of Columbia 58% 18% 
Ohio 57% 14% 
 
Rhode Island 104% 1% 
        North Dakota 21% 50% 
 
Source: SNAP Participation Rates obtained from Economic Research Service (ERS), U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA). Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Data System. Soda sales 
calculated based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC and marketing databases provided by 
the Kilts Center for Marketing Data Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business. 
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Table 3-4. Summary Statistics by Cohort 
 
Treatment Control 
Weekly Soda Sales $50,005 $27,518 
Median Income $46,022 $43,595 
Population 152,975 78,727 
Mean Soda Tax 4.2% 3.9% 
Mean Soda Tax if Positive 5.4% 5.0% 
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Table 3-5. Change in Average Weekly County-Level Soda Sales by 
Cohort 
 
Pre-recession Post-recession Difference 
Treatment $46,399  $50,881  $4,483  
Control $26,581  $27,732  $1,151  
Difference $19,818  $23,149  $3,331  
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Table 3-6. Difference-In-Difference Estimates on Weekly Carbonated 
Soda Sales 
 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
Treatment*Recession ($) 1668 1599 1355*** 1133*   1837 
 
(1132) (1141.74) (491) (676) (2421) 
Income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Population Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tax No Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 1,167,492 1,167,296 699,201 699,005 699,005 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
     Note 1: Standard errors for all specifications are multi-way clustered by state and year 
Note 2: Specifications in columns (I) through (IV) include state and year fixed effects while column 
(V) includes county and year fixed effects. 
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Table 3-7. Difference-In-Difference Estimates on Weekly Carbonated 
Soda Sales (Full) 
 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) 
Treat*Recession ($) 1668 1599 1355*** 1133*   1837 1695 2150 
 
(1132) (1141.74) (491) (676) (2421) (1404) (2141) 
Median Household Income 0.362** 0.362** 0.891*** 0.890*** 0.507**  0.237 0.202 
 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.3) (0.29) (0.2) (0.188) (0.171) 
Population 0.337*** 0.337*** 0.242*** 0.242*** 0.244*** 0.322*** 0.334*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.021) (0.023) 
Tax - 626 - 1626 -216 -1174 836 
 
- (780) - (1070) (475) (1179) (723) 
Treat*Soda Tax - - - - - - 395 
 
- - - - - - (1301) 
Tax*Recession - - - - - - 31.2 
 
- - - - - - (229) 
Treat*Tax* Recession - - - - - - -92 
 
- - - - - - (430) 
Constant 
-
27122*** 
-
29689*** 
-
34590*** 
-
41345*** 
-
11365**  -4809 -5489 
 
(4098) (5403) (8479) (10094) (5043) (7912) (6479) 
Observations 1,167,492 1,167,296 699,201 699,005 699,005 730,708 1,167,296 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
      Note 1: Standard errors for all specifications are multi-way clustered by state and year 
  
Note 2: All specifications include state and year fixed effects with the exception of column (V) which 
includes county and year fixed effects 
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Table 3-8. Difference-In-Difference Estimates on Log Per-Capita 
Sales of Carbonated Soda 
 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
Treat*Recession 0.011 0.011 0.005 0.005 -0.077 
 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.17) 
Median Household Income 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.015*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Tax - 0.001 - 0.007 -0.047 
 
- (0.02) - (0.03) (0.02) 
Constant 3.423*** 3.414*** 3.209*** 3.131*** 4.888*** 
 
(0.13) (0.29) (0.23) (0.38) (0.34) 
Observations 1,167,492 1,167,296 699,201 699,005 699,005 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
    Note 1: Standard errors for all specifications are multi-way clustered by state and year 
Note 2: All specifications include state and year fixed effects with the exception of column (V) which includes county 
and year fixed effects 
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Table 3-9. Difference-In-Difference Model on Weekly Carbonated 
Soda Sales with Leads and Lags (Base Level: 2006) 
 
Total Sales 
 
Per-Capita 
Sales 
2007*Treat 1106 
 
14.53**  
 
(1013) 
 
(7.29) 
2008*Treat 1909* 
 
21.79*** 
 
(1129) 
 
(7.04) 
2009*Treat 2233** 
 
25.87*** 
 
(1123) 
 
(8.33) 
2010*Treat 1764** 
 
28.46*** 
 
(784) 
 
(8.77) 
2011*Treat 2111*** 
 
20.99**  
 
(622) 
 
(8.18) 
2012*Treat 1589** 
 
14.24**  
 
(668) 
 
(6.76) 
2013*Treat 886 
 
8.564 
 
(837) 
 
(8.40) 
Median Household Income 0.394** 
 
0.244*** 
 
(161) 
 
(0.68) 
Population 0.337*** 
 
- 
 
(20) 
 
- 
Tax 1709 
 
1.50 
 
(1088) 
 
(5.32) 
Constant -46738*** 
 
1.70 
 
(12176) 
 
(60.52) 
Observations 1,167,492   1,167,492 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note 1: Standard errors for all specifications are multi-way clustered by state 
and year 
Note 2: All specifications include state and year fixed effects 
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Table 3-10. Difference-In-Difference Estimates on Weekly 
Carbonated Soda Sales with Week Fixed Effects 
 
Total Sales   
Per-Capita 
Sales 
Treat*Recession 3613** 
 
0.271*** 
 
(1611) 
 
(0.07) 
Median Household Income 0.393** 
 
0.018*** 
 
(161) 
 
(0.00) 
Population 0.337*** 
 
- 
 
-0.02 
 
- 
Tax 1638 
 
0.002 
 
(1112) 
 
(0.03) 
Constant -42479*** 
 
3.7*** 
 
(12087) 
 
(0.36) 
Observations 1,167,492   1,167,296 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
 
 Note 1: Standard errors for all specifications are multi-way clustered by state and year 
Note 2: All specifications include state and week fixed effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
Table 3-11. Average Weekly County-Level Change in Carbonated 
Soda Sales Relative to SNAP Benefits 
 
Pre-
recession 
Post-
recession Difference 
Percentage 
Change 
SNAP benefits $187,558 $347,145 $159,587 85.1% 
Soda sales $38,054 $40,779 $2,726 7.16% 
Percentage change in soda sales relative to 1% increase in SNAP benefits 0.08% 
Note: SNAP benefit data is obtained from the SNAP Data System of the Economic Research Service, 
USDA. Soda sales are estimated from Neilsen RetailScan Dataset. 
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Table 3-12. Change in Average Weekly County-Level SNAP Benefits 
by Cohort 
 
Pre-recession Post-recession Difference 
Treatment $253,285 $482,896 $229,610 
Control $116,960 $201,629 $84,668 
Difference $136,325 $281,267 $144,942 
Note: All estimates are obtained from the SNAP Data System of the 
Economic Research Service, USDA 
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IX. Figures 
Figure 3-1: Treatment and Control States by Index of Willingness, 
2008, Factor 1 only 
 
Note: Dark-colored states are more willing (treatment) states and light-colored states are less 
willing (control) states.  
Source: Economic Research Service (ERS), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). SNAP 
Policy Database, 2013 
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Figure 3-2: Treatment and Control States by Index of Willingness, 
2008, Using Factor 1 and Factor 2 
 Note: Dark-colored states are more willing (treatment) states and light-colored states are less 
willing (control) states. 
Source: Economic Research Service (ERS), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). SNAP 
Policy Database, 2013 
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Figure 3-3: Combined State and Local Grocery Tax by County, 2014 
 
Sources: tax-rates.org, www.sale-tax.com, and state and local departments of taxation. 
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Figure 3-4: SNAP Participation by Cohort Indexed to 2008, 2006 to 
2012 
 
Note: A complete list of states in the treatment and control group is given in Table 1.  
Source: Economic Research Service (ERS), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Data System 
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Figure 3-5: Weekly Carbonated Soda Sales by Cohort Indexed to 
2008, 2006 to 2015 
 
Note: A complete list of states in the treatment and control group is given in Table 3-3. 
Source: Calculated based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC and marketing 
databases provided by the Kilts Center for Marketing Data Center at The University of 
Chicago Booth School of Business. 
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CHAPTER 4: HABIT FORMATION IN US DEMAND FOR DIETARY FAT 
I estimate habit formation to dietary fat in two categories of common food products: 
ground meat and milk. Each product in the category shows fat content on the front 
packaging which alleviates the issue of nutrient misinformation at the grocery store shelf. 
This allows for comparison to be made across products with different fat contents. I 
construct a dynamic AIDS model using scanner-generated purchases during the period 
2004 to 2014 obtained from Nielsen Consumer Panel Dataset. Results show strong habit 
formation to all products in the two categories. However, there is only sparse evidence of 
a positive association between habit formation and dietary fat for ground meat products 
and no evidence for fluid milk products. This leads to the conclusion that dietary fat, as a 
nutrient, does not exhibit significant habit formation even though products containing 
dietary fat might be habitual. Habit formation parameters coupled with elasticity 
estimates provide support for a tax on saturated fat as a possible obesity-targeting policy 
intervention. 
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I. Introduction 
Obesity has reached epidemic proportions in the US. Statistics from the National Health 
and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) show that between 2009 and 2010, more 
than 1 in 3 adults are considered to be obese. The prevalence of childhood obesity is 
especially alarming as more than 1 in 6 children and adolescents aged 6 to 19 are 
considered obese (National Institute of Health, 2012). A wide range of detrimental health 
outcomes is associated with obesity including diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, and 
cancer. In addition, children are considered especially vulnerable to health issues arising 
from obesity because it not only leads to abnormalities such as earlier puberty, type 2 
diabetes, and metabolic syndrome (Biro and Wien, 2010) but also leads to greater 
likelihood of obesity as an adult (Serdula et al., 1993). 
While numerous explanations and policy recommendations have been offered for 
such a high rate of obesity in the country, there are only few factors that have consensus 
among researchers. Traditionally, obesity has been attributed to lack of access to healthy 
food, cognitive disposition, food acquisition cycles, etc. However, in recent years 
economists have started to consider the time-dependence of energy-dense nutrients, such 
as sugar and saturated fat, as a possible explanation. If unhealthy nutrients have addictive 
properties then households might not alter consumption patterns despite interventions 
such as participation in SNAP. Becker and Murphy (1988) have developed a theory of 
“rational addiction” which predicts that households may choose to consume habit 
forming goods even with full knowledge of their addictive properties because this 
consumption pattern maximizes their discounted utility. 
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The purpose of this study is to determine whether households form a habit of 
consuming dietary fat. Dietary fat is fat obtained from food consumption as opposed to 
fat naturally produced in the human body to aid in normal bodily functions. While dietary 
fat is an important nutrient, there is considerable evidence to show that excess 
consumption is a significant contributor to obesity (Bray and Popkin, 1998; Golay and 
Bobbioni, 1997; Astrup, 2005, Bray et al., 2004). This is not surprising because fat is the 
most energy-dense nutrient found in food (9 calories per gram compared to 4 calories per 
gram in carbohydrates and protein). In addition, food products contain multiple types of 
fat (for example, saturated, polyunsaturated, and monounsaturated) with varying 
thresholds for overconsumption, which makes it difficult for consumers to distinguish 
harmful calories from nutritious ones. 
In an effort to combat obesity, in recent years policymakers have begun to explore 
ways to curb fat consumption. A policy quickly gaining traction is the imposition of a 
Pigouvian tax on fatty foods akin to a tax on tobacco, alcohol, and sugar. In October 
2011, Denmark became the first country in the world to pass a “fat tax”, which was 
levied on food items exceeding 2.3% saturated fat content. Although the tax was 
rescinded shortly afterwards, it galvanized substantial interest into whether it can be a 
valid policy intervention in the US. Although there is no history of a fat tax in the US, 
other Pigouvian taxes like a tobacco tax have shown remarkable results. 
I consider two categories of grocery products that are widely used in American 
households; fresh ground meat and milk. Products in both categories are differentiated by 
level of fat content specified directly on the package and therefore households are aware 
of the nutritional properties of their purchase. For example, ground beef may be labeled 
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as “80% lean, 20% fat” while milk products may contain one percent or two percent fat. 
This study empirically tests the hypothesis that households that consistently purchase 
products with high fat content develop a habit which has a non-trivial effect on future 
household utility derived from that product. I construct a dynamic Almost Ideal Demand 
System (AIDS) model to estimate the magnitude of habit formation to each product in the 
fresh ground meat and milk categories. The relevance of the hypothesis is that if the 
strength of habit formation is positively associated with fat content then price shocks will 
do little to sway household expenditure towards healthier options. Results show strong 
habit formation to all products in the two categories. In addition, results show some 
evidence of a positive link between habit formation parameters and fat content in the 
ground meat category but no discernible relationship in the milk category. Habit 
formation parameters coupled with elasticity estimates provide support for a tax on 
saturated fat as a possible obesity-targeting policy intervention. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a review 
of literature in this area. Section III develops the conceptual dynamic AIDS model used 
to test the above hypothesis. Section IV outlines the empirical framework. Section V 
describes the dataset used and provides summary statistics. Section VI reports results 
from empirical estimation. Section VII discusses policy relevance and possible areas of 
improvement for future research. Section VIII concludes and is followed by a group of 
tables in section IX. 
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II. Literature Review 
Habit formation has been extensively studied in literature on multiple categories of 
goods, including food (Carrasco et al., 2005; Heien and Durham, 1991; Dynan, 2000; 
Khare and Inman, 2006), transportation (Carrasco et al., 2005; Heien and Durham, 1991), 
services (Carrasco et al., 2005), alcohol, tobacco, and clothing (Heien and Durham, 
1991). The most common method of estimating habit formation is to exploit time-series 
variation in large datasets to observe the dependence of current consumption on 
consumption in previous periods. However, a few researchers such as Bruijn et al. (2008) 
and Heien and Durham (1991) have utilized cross-sectional datasets to estimate the 
magnitude of habit formation as well. Heien and Durham (1991) find that cross-sectional 
estimates tend to be much smaller, albeit highly significant, relative to time-series 
estimates. 
 Habit formation to products in the food category has been the focus of many 
previous studies but only a handful are directed at meat and milk products. Among 
literature that looks into habit forming properties of milk, Briz et al. (1998) employ the 
Prais-Houthakker demand model to show that milk consumption in Spain is heavily 
influenced by habit persistence. Zhen et al. (2011) use a dynamic AIDS model on a group 
of beverages such as milk, Sugar-Sweetened Beverages (SSBs), bottled water, and coffee 
and find that low-fat milk is the most habit-forming beverage. Whole milk also exhibits a 
high degree of habit formation in their analysis and ranks among the top three most 
habitual beverages. Similar studies can be found on the habit-formation properties of 
meat. For example, Capps (1989) use data from a Houston retail food firm to show that 
habits are evident in the consumption of steak, chicken, pork chops, ham, and pork loin. 
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 Supplementing this strand of literature is a small collection of studies that 
examine the addictive properties of dietary fat. A recent study by Bruijn et al. (2008) 
depicts that saturated fat is associated with habit formation. The main shortcoming of this 
paper, however, is that it relies on cross-sectional data and therefore largely ignores the 
possible confounding influence of household preferences over time. Furthermore, fat 
content is self-reported by participants, which might lead to bias. Richards et al. (2007) 
consider the consumption of snack foods to determine rational addiction to 
macronutrients. Their results show strong habit formation to fat. However, the study is 
conducted on a sample of only 30 households and is not generalizable. Therefore, there is 
a clear lack of comprehensive evidence of habit formation to dietary fat in literature. 
The results of this study shed some light on the potential success of a fat tax. 
Some research has been devoted to the efficacy of a tax on saturated fat but it is largely 
constricted by lack of data due to sparse adoption of the policy. Smed et al. (2007) 
analyze the potential of targeted price change and show that it is effective in reducing 
demand for saturated fat among individuals in “lower social classes” (p. 627) and among 
young individuals in Denmark. Chouinard et al. (2007) simulate the effects of a fat tax on 
demand for dairy products and find that the short run effect of a 10% fat tax would 
reduce fat consumption by less than 1%. This area of literature is largely inconclusive in 
determining the magnitude of a tax on fat consumption. Neither of the two studies 
mentioned take habit formation into account. 
To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to measure habit formation for 
dietary fat in fresh meat and milk products using household-level panel data. It will add 
to existing literature by enhancing our understanding of the addictive properties of dietary 
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fat. While other studies have provided elasticity estimates for products analyzed in this 
paper, they largely ignore the influence of habit formation on household responsiveness 
to price changes. Moreover, I estimate demand over an 11 year period while other studies 
generally consider shorter periods of time. Hence, I provide a more complete picture of 
the link between habit formation and dietary fat. Finally, this study provides more 
granular estimates because it groups products into more specific categories relative to 
other studies (for example, ground meat versus all meat products). 
III. Conceptual Model 
I closely follow the conceptual framework of the dynamic AIDS model laid out in Zhen 
et al. (2011) and apply it to fresh ground meat products and milk purchased in grocery 
stores. For the sake of simplicity, I depart from Zhen et al.’s (2011) approach by 
excluding the durability parameter. Durability refers to the idea that purchases in current 
period have a positive influence on future utility. Even though perishable items such as 
fresh ground meat and milk are not considered durable, Zhen et al. argue that they could 
still exhibit nonzero durability by reflecting both the physical trait as well as consumer 
preference of the product (2011, p. 178). In other words, despite physical depletion the 
perishable item may exert an influence on future consumption by altering current 
household preference. However, I defer to the argument put forth by Muellbauer and 
Pashardes (1992) that the habit formation parameter is capable of capturing both habit 
formation and durability. Foregoing the inclusion of durability lends substantial 
computational simplicity to the dynamic AIDS and allows for a more straightforward 
interpretation of the habit formation parameters. 
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A two-stage process is modeled for the representative consumer who allots total 
income between a product category (ground meat and milk) and the numeraire good (all 
other goods) in the first stage, and chooses between different products in each category in 
the second stage. Assuming a myopic consumer (one who ignores the effects of current 
purchases on future utility), Zhen et al.’s (2011) demand system is given by: 
(1) 𝑞𝑖𝑡 = {𝑎𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗ln𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖[𝑙𝑛?̅? − ln𝑎(𝑝𝑡)]
𝐽
𝑗=1 } (
?̅?𝑡
𝑝𝑖𝑡
) + 𝜑𝑖𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑑𝑖𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 
(2) 𝑙𝑛𝑥?̅? = 𝑎𝑚 + 𝛽𝑚 ln(ℎℎ𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑡) + 𝛾𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑎(𝑝𝑡) 
(3) 𝑙𝑛𝑎(𝑝𝑡) = 𝑎0 + ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 0.5
𝑛
𝑖=1 ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1  
(4) 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖0 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝑄𝑡 
where 𝑞𝑖𝑡 represents expenditure on product 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑝𝑗𝑡 is a vector of all prices in the 
product group, 𝑍𝑖 is the service provided by the flow of good in period t, group 
expenditure is given by ?̅? = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑍𝑖𝑡
∗𝑛
𝑖=1 , and ln𝑎(𝑝𝑡) is the price index of the product 
groups shown in equation (3). In equation (4) the parameter 𝑎𝑖 is augmented into 
household-level demographic variables 𝑋𝑖, binary variables each for Nielsen market 𝑅𝑚𝑡, 
and quarters 𝑄𝑡 in the year. The coefficients 𝜑𝑖  and 𝑑𝑖 capture habit formation and 
durability respectively. Theoretically, 𝜑𝑖 is expected to have a negative sign because 
habit formation is meant to decrease current utility as consumers get conditioned to a 
stock of utility from past consumption. Conversely, 𝑑𝑖 is expected to be positive because 
durability will increase current utility as the service flow from previous periods will carry 
over to the current period. As mentioned above I do not incorporate durability in the 
AIDS model and therefore estimate the equation without the component 𝑑𝑖𝑍𝑖𝑡−1. 
90 
 
Equation (2) represents the first-stage decision of the household to allocate expenditure to 
the product group relative to the numeraire good. The first-stage budget allocation is a 
function of ℎℎ𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑡, which represents per capita household income, and the price index of 
all products in the group, 𝑙𝑛𝑎(𝑝𝑡). For a full discussion and derivation of the dynamic 
AIDS model refer to Zhen et al. (2011). 
IV. Empirical Model 
Each major product within the ground meat and fluid milk category is included in the 
AIDS model. Product types in the ground meat category include beef, turkey, chicken, 
and pork. Beef and turkey products are classified by fat content using a threshold of 20% 
fat. For example, ground beef is characterized as high fat beef if the product is specified 
as having 25% fat or being 75% lean. Chicken and pork are combined to create one 
product type due to limited purchases of both. The chicken/pork product type is not 
classified by high or low fat since neither category exhibits sufficient variation in fat 
content. The milk category includes products classified by 1% fat, 0.5% fat, 1.5% fat, 2% 
fat, whole milk, and fat free milk. Whole milk contains approximately 3.25% fat and is 
therefore the highest fat product in this category. Fat-free milk can contain up to 0.5% fat. 
For the sake of simplicity and because 1.5% and 0.5% fat products represent a negligible 
share of total milk expenditure, I combine these two products with 1% fat product type. 
These classifications result in five product types in the ground meat category and four 
product types in the milk category. The AIDS model is estimated separately for each of 
the two categories. 
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The biggest challenge to estimating dynamic AIDS is addressing the issue of zero 
purchases. That is, within a market, year, and month, the total expenditure for a product 
in the ground milk or meat category may be zero. This may be an indication of sequential 
decision-making such that the household must decide whether to purchase the product 
first, followed by the decision of how much to purchase. Since there may be unobserved 
factors that influence the household’s first decision, the model may suffer from selection 
bias if zero purchases are left unaddressed. I follow Zhen et al.’s (2011) synthetic 
household approach by averaging monthly purchases to create a representative household 
within each market-year. In other words, a synthetic household represents all households 
in a particular market in a particular year. Zhen et al. (2011) include poverty status as 
factor to group individual households into a synthetic household. However, for the 
categories of products considered in this study, a higher level of aggregation is required 
to eliminate zero purchases. The resulting data includes 836 synthetic households in the 
ground meat sample and 1,672 synthetic households in the milk sample. 
The Fisher price index is used to determine prices for products in each category. 
Prices and quantities are averaged over market, brand, poverty status, and month. In other 
words, prices for each brand in a month faced by a synthetic household of a certain 
poverty status are averaged to create the Fisher price index. Poverty status is used to 
capture the possibility that low-income households typically shop in different market sub-
sections relative to high-income households. The Fisher price index is a transformation of 
the Laspeyres price index and the Paasche price index and is calculated by comparing 
average market-brand-month-poverty status prices with national averages. Missing prices 
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are inferred by prediction using coefficients estimated from the regression of product 
price on year, month, market, and brand. 
To simplify estimation, I reduce brand parameters by condensing brands with 
small market shares into a category-specific composite brand. The composite brand 
includes all brands with less than 1% market share in their respective category. All major 
brands are included separately. Demographics include dummy variables for each Nielsen 
market, household size, race, income, gender of household head, and quarter in which the 
household is observed. These variables are averaged over all households represented by 
the synthetic household to assign continuous measures of each demographic. 
V. Data 
Two samples are generated from data obtained from Nielsen’s Consumer Panel survey. 
Nielsen provides a large nationally representative scanner panel dataset of household 
level purchases for 40,000 to 60,000 households per year dispersed across the country. A 
tremendous amount of detail is available for each purchase including the date of the 
shopping trip, store location, average weekly prices, quantities purchased, etc. Household 
demographics include income, composition, presence of children, gender and 
employment status of the household head, race of the household head, and geography at 
the three digit zip-code level. Nielsen samples households across 52 major markets that 
cover most of the country. 
The dataset covers a range of different food and non-food products, each 
characterized by a unique Universal Product Code (UPC). Product attributes include 
brand, size of package, promotional status, and additional characteristics for some 
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products such as flavor and nutritional value. Products in the ground meat and milk 
category include full information on fat content for each UPC. I use all purchases 
available in the Nielsen Consumer Panel dataset during the years 2004 to 2014. This 
results in a sample of 10,024 monthly purchases in the ground meat category and a 
sample of 19,972 monthly purchases in the milk category at the synthetic household 
level. 
Table 4-1 shows average monthly synthetic household-level expenditure and 
quantity of purchases in the two categories. The first two columns depict values for full 
samples of each category. The next two depict values for lower income households that 
have income less than the median income ($56,650) of the full sample. The first panel of 
the table shows that lower-income households have a stronger preference for chicken and 
pork in the ground meat category and a weaker preference for both types of turkey 
products. Comparison for milk products is given in the second panel. On average, low 
income households consume less of all types of milk. 
Tables 4-2(a) and 4-2(b) show summary statistics for variables in each category. 
In the ground meat sample (table 4-2(a)), the two ground beef products have the highest 
share of total category expenditure per month, followed by low-fat turkey. High fat 
turkey and chicken & pork products constitute a very small proportion of monthly 
expenditure. On average, synthetic households spend an aggregate of $586 on the five 
ground meat categories included in this model per month. Average household size is 2.57 
individuals, the sample includes about 10% of households that are black, mean annual 
income per synthetic household is just under $58,000, and about 78% of households have 
male heads. Table 4-2(b) shows summary statistics for variables in the milk category. 
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Among milk products, the largest budget share is attributed to 2% fat milk, followed by 
whole milk and fat-free milk. Monthly expenditure per synthetic household on the milk 
category is considerably higher than that of the ground meat category. Annual household 
income for the milk sample is approximately $43,000 per annum which represents a non-
trivial difference from the ground meat sample. This is not surprising given that milk is a 
more common household food and the category is more broadly defined (including 
almost all milk products) relative to meat. In addition, milk is generally available to 
households of all income strata and is a more affordable source of nutrition relative to 
ground meat. 
VI. Results 
The habit formation parameters for each product category estimated from the dynamic 
AIDS model are shown in Table 4-3. The first panel of the table shows results for all five 
products in the ground meat category and the second panel shows results for the four 
products included in the milk category. Each product exhibits strong habit formation as 
given by the significance level of the estimates.  
The results show there is a clear positive association between dietary fat content 
and strength of habit formation, although the effect is invariably small. For the ground 
meat category, there is little variation in habit formation across products. As expected, 
among ground beef and ground turkey products, high fat products are slightly more habit 
forming than low fat products. The combined product “chicken & pork” shows the 
weakest level of habit persistence. This is also expected because the product is likely the 
least fat content product relative to others in the category. Ground chicken is generally 
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the leanest type of meat. Recall that chicken and pork products were grouped together to 
represent one product due to lack of sufficient observations for each individual product. 
However, the combined product reflects substantially greater number of purchases of 
chicken products than pork products. Therefore, the habit formation parameter for this 
product is likely driven by ground chicken rather than ground pork. While the habit 
formation parameters in this category are positively correlated with fat content, high fat 
products are only marginally more habit forming than low fat products. 
With the exception of fat-free milk, milk products generally exhibit a positive 
relationship between fat content and level of habit formation as well. Whole milk has a 
higher degree of habit formation relative to 2% milk, which has a higher degree of habit 
formation relative to 1% milk. The lowest fat content product (fat-free milk) 
unexpectedly has a larger habit formation parameter relative to 1% and 2% milk. 
However, the parameters for all other milk products are consistent with expectations and 
provide strong evidence for the habit forming properties of saturated fat. In addition, 
there is little variation in habit formation parameters between products which indicates 
that fat content has only a modest impact on habit formation. 
 Table 4-4 shows long run unconditional own-price and cross-price elasticities. 
For the ground meat category, all own-price elasticities are negative and statistically 
significant. Ground chicken and pork demand seems to be the most sensitive and ground 
low-fat turkey demand is the least sensitive to own-price effects. The magnitude of the 
elasticities is consistent with the results of Capps (1989) who estimated own-price 
elasticities for several beef, chicken, and pork products (including ground meat) in the 
range of -0.6557 and -1.2737. Furthermore, ground beef products and ground chicken and 
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pork products consistently show negative cross-price elasticity indicating 
complementarity with other products. High-fat ground turkey, on the other hand, is 
largely considered a substitute for other products in the category. 
In the same vein, all own-price elasticities of milk products are negative and all 
are statistically significant with the exception of fat-free milk. The estimates for these 
products are much less elastic relative to -1.59 for whole milk and -2.17 for low-fat milk 
obtained by Zhen et al. (2011). A possible explanation for this discrepancy might be that 
Zhen et al. (2011) aggregate all fluid milk products into two products while I estimate 
elasticities for four different milk products. Among cross-price elasticities, almost all that 
are statistically significant are negative. This is, again, an indication that milk products 
within the category are generally complementary to each other. 
VII. Discussion 
The results show that while ground meat and milk products are very habitual, high fat 
products are only slightly more habit forming than lower fat products. In the milk 
category, not only are habit formation parameters much smaller, the coefficient on fat-
free milk is inconsistent with expectations. This might be due to a number of reasons. 
First, there is substantially greater variation in the fat content level of ground meat 
products. Recall, products were labeled as “high fat” if they contained 20% fat or greater. 
Fat content in ground meat products ranges from 1% (99% lean) to 40% (60% lean). The 
broad range in ground meat products provides a clear distinction between what 
consumers may consider high fat versus low fat. For products in the milk category, 
however, the fat content range is relatively narrow. The highest fat product (whole milk) 
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contains only 3.25% fat while the lowest fat product (fat-free milk) can contain up to 
0.5% fat. Due to the lack of variation in fat content in milk, the habit forming properties 
of fat may not be fully realized. Second, fat-free milk might be considered a specialty 
product that may appeal to unobservable traits of consumers. If these traits influence 
demand for fat-free milk differently relative to other products in the category, the habit 
formation parameter will be biased. Overall, due to such small magnitude of coefficients 
habit formation is likely insufficient to drastically influence demand for dietary fat. 
This result has immense policy implications. Because the influence of habit on 
consumption behavior is small, household demand is likely more responsive to a targeted 
tax on saturated fat. In addition, certain products such as high fat turkey are substitutable 
with lower fat products such as chicken and pork and low fat turkey. In these cases, a tax 
on saturated fat might have the intended consequence of shifting household consumption 
to lower fat products. However, tax policy should be designed with the consideration that 
other high-fat products (for example, ground beef) are complementary to low-fat 
products. In such cases, price increases might fail to achieve the desired consumption 
shift because consumers will forego purchases of low-fat products as well. Additional 
work is required in this area to determine the potential efficacy of a fat tax in the US. 
However, the results of this model lend credence to the fat tax as a viable policy option. 
Some shortcomings of the analysis are worth mentioning. First, to circumvent the 
problem of zero purchases I use a synthetic household approach. This led to the 
aggregation of purchases for each market-year and this censoring might have led to 
substantial loss of information. Second, due to lack of observations and variation in fat 
content, chicken and pork in the ground meat category were amalgamated into one 
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product. This inhibits the measurement of each individual product’s habit formation 
parameter and elasticities which may have proven useful for the analysis. Third, for the 
sake of computational simplicity I chose not to model durability in the dynamic AIDS 
model. Literature provides sufficient support for this decision. However, there is an 
argument that durability might exist for food products. Therefore, future studies may 
provide more insight by estimating the durability parameter in a demand system. 
VIII. Conclusion 
I estimate a dynamic AIDS model to estimate habit formation to dietary fat. I consider 
two categories of products that explicitly state fat content information on the label thus 
eliminating any prospect for misinformation in nutritional value. The ground meat 
category includes high fat beef, low fat beef, high fat turkey, low fat turkey, and chicken 
and pork products. Products are characterized high fat if they contain at least 20% fat. 
The milk category includes fat-free, 1% fat, 2% fat, and whole milk products. The 
dynamic AIDS model is estimated separately for ground beef and milk categories. 
Results show strong habit formation to each product in the two categories. In addition, 
there is a clear positive association between fat content and strength of habit formation. 
However, evidence of habit formation to dietary fat is weak as indicated by the 
magnitude of habit formation parameters. This provides evidence that while dietary fat 
may be an addictive nutrient, a tax on saturated fat might be effective in reducing 
household demand for high fat products. 
 
Note: “Calculated (or Derived) based on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC and marketing databases 
provided by the Kilts Center for Marketing Data Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business.” 
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IX. Tables 
Table 4-1. Average Monthly Expenditure and Quantity by Synthetic 
Household 
 
Full Sample   
Households with Income 
in the 50% Percentile 
 
Quantity Expenditure 
 
Quantity Expenditure 
Ground Meat: 
     Beef: High Fat 52 $261 
 
48 $248 
Beef: Low Fat 48 $236 
 
38 $182 
Turkey: High Fat 13 $35 
 
3 $10 
Turkey: Low Fat 48 $184 
 
10 $25 
Chicken & Pork 5 $21 
 
28 $101 
      Milk: 
     Fat Free 252 $662 
 
103 $264 
1% Fat 165 $441 
 
58 $154 
2% Fat 340 $919 
 
156 $426 
Whole Milk 173 $473   99 $277 
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Table 4-2(a). Summary Statistics of Sample: Ground Meat Category 
 
Mean Std. Dev. 
Budget Shares 
  Beef: High Fat 0.35 0.17 
Beef: Low Fat 0.34 0.16 
Turkey: High Fat 0.02 0.03 
Turkey: Low Fat 0.29 0.20 
Chicken & Pork 0.01 0.02 
   Monthly Expenditure on Category by 
Synthetic HH $586 $501 
Household size 2.57 0.16 
Percentage of population that is black 9.8% 8.01 
Annual Income per Synthetic HH $57,857 $8,193 
Percentage of HH heads that are male 78% 4.32 
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Table 4-2(b). Summary Statistics of Sample: Milk Category 
 
Mean Std. Dev. 
Budget Shares 
  1% Fat Milk 0.16 0.13 
2% Fat Milk 0.39 0.17 
Whole Milk 0.22 0.16 
Fat-free Milk 0.22 0.15 
   Monthly Expenditure on Category by 
Synthetic HH $2,454 $2,316 
Household size 2.48 0.24 
Percentage of population that is black 8.7% 6.3 
Annual Income per Synthetic HH $42,959 $22,978 
Percentage of HH heads that are male 71% 10.21 
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Table 4-3. Habit Formation Parameter Estimates 
 
φi Standard Errors 
Ground Meat 
  Beef: High Fat 0.496*** (0.0052) 
Beef: Low Fat 0.484*** (0.0051) 
Turkey: High Fat 0.553*** (0.0069) 
Turkey: Low Fat 0.495*** (0.0051) 
Chicken & Pork 0.375*** (0.0189) 
   Milk 
  1% Fat 0.060*** (0.0065) 
2% Fat 0.067*** (0.0059) 
Whole 0.073*** (0.0061) 
Fat-free 0.069*** (0.0168) 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 4-4. Long Run Unconditional Own and Cross-Price Elasticities 
Ground Meat 
Beef: 
High Fat 
Beef: 
Low Fat 
Turkey: 
High Fat 
Turkey: 
Low Fat 
Chicken 
& Pork 
Beef: High Fat -.899*** -.044*** -.005** -.064*** -.002** 
Beef: Low Fat -.033*** -.727*** -.008*** -.222*** -0.005*** 
Turkey: High Fat -.010* .042*** -.968*** .038*** .023*** 
Turkey: Low Fat -.057***  -.209*** -.003 -.703*** .008*** 
Chicken & Pork .068 -.582*** -.056*** -.487*** -1.28*** 
      Milk 1% Fat 2% Fat Whole Fat-free 
 1% Fat -0.732*** -.067*** -.1538*** -.065** 
 2% Fat -.056*** -.576*** -.219*** -.146*** 
 Whole -.144*** -.203*** -.448*** .175*** 
 Fat-free  -.058*** -0.14*** .170*** -0.623***   
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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